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Reconstruction
Peter Nicolas*
The U.S. Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting the U.S. Constitution in general and
the Reconstruction Amendments in particular substantially constrain the ability of legislative
and executive actors to address a variety of hot-button political issues, including abortion, gay
rights, and affirmative action. So important are the Court’s decisions that the ability to
appoint Justices who will shift the Court’s direction has been a central issue in recent
presidential campaigns. Throughout history, decisive shifts in the Court’s composition have
resulted in correspondingly dramatic shifts in constitutional doctrine. Yet surprisingly, these
dramatic shifts have occurred with the Court rarely overturning any precedent.
Although others have identified selected instances of the Court engaging in stealth
revision of precedent, this Article is both the first to provide a detailed taxonomy of the methods
employed and to exhaustively consider their use in construing the Reconstruction Amendments.
This stealth process, which this Article refers to as judicial reconstruction, occurs when the
Court employs one or more of three different methods of transforming constitutional
doctrine: selective quotation of precedent; re-characterization of precedent; and citations to
“dissenting concurrences”—separate opinions in earlier cases that are concurrences in form
but dissents in substance. Through the use of these methods, liberal and conservative justices
alike have dramatically transformed constitutional law even when their decisions are
unsupported by and at times diametrically at odds with the Court’s earlier precedents.
This Article concludes that U.S. Senators and commentators, with their almost
laser-like focus on fidelity to stare decisis during the confirmation process, have
overlooked—and perhaps even fostered—the opaque practice of reconstructing rather than the
transparent process of overruling precedent. It further concludes that those examining judicial
nominees’ commitment to respecting precedent should examine not merely their formal fidelity
to stare decisis but instead their history of and views on reconstructing precedent.

* William L. Dwyer Endowed Chair in Law, University of Washington. I am indebted to my research
assistant, Marten King, for his assistance, editing, and feedback. I also wish to thank Helen A. Anderson,
Mary D. Fan, Robert Gomulkiewicz, Maureen A. Howard, Lisa Marshall Manheim, Hugh Spitzer, and
Kathryn Watts for their valuable suggestions and feedback.
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INTRODUCTION
In the United States today, legislative and executive discretion to address
certain divisive political issues—including abortion,1 gay rights,2 gun control,3
religious freedom,4 and affirmative action5—is circumscribed by U.S. Supreme
Court decisions that curtail such discretion, because it interferes with individual
rights explicitly or implicitly guaranteed by various constitutional provisions, most
1. E.g., Whole Woman’s Health v. Hellerstedt, 136 S. Ct. 2292 (2016).
2. E.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
3. E.g., McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010); District of Columbia v. Heller, 554
U.S. 570 (2008).
4. E.g., City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
5. E.g., Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003).
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notably the Reconstruction Amendments.6 Because the freedom to address such
issues is judicially constrained, a major focus of each presidential election cycle is
on the number of new U.S. Supreme Court Justices each candidate will likely be
able to appoint and its probable impact on future legislative and
executive discretion.7
Such discussions recur each time a vacancy actually arises during a President’s
term, with commentators asking whether the appointment will result in the newly
composed Court overruling some or all of the Court’s earlier decisions and legal
pundits sparring on the legitimacy of the Court overruling precedent.8 During
confirmation hearings, in which nominees rarely express an opinion on the
constitutional issues themselves, nominees are instead intensively grilled on their
fidelity to the doctrine of stare decisis, particularly where constitutional decisions
are involved.9
Yet despite the Court’s frequent lurches leftward or rightward throughout
history, the Court almost never explicitly overrules any of its constitutional
decisions. Decisions such as Lawrence v. Texas,10 which struck down a state law
criminalizing consensual sodomy and in so doing explicitly overruled its earlier
decision in Bowers v. Hardwick,11 are exceedingly rare.
This is not to say that the Court’s interpretation of the U.S. Constitution has
remained consistent over time or that the appointment of new Justices has no
impact on the trajectory of the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence. Indeed, were
one to compare the Court’s decisions interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments
in the decades immediately following their ratification with the Court’s modern
decisions regarding those same provisions, one might well conclude that the
decisions were the products of two diametrically opposite constitutional systems.
This is so despite the absence of any relevant constitutional amendments during the
interim period and few explicit instances of overruling precedent.
In this Article, I identify and describe a stealth process of judicial reconstruction
of precedent that often achieves the same end result as explicitly overruling

6.
The phrase “Reconstruction Amendments” is used throughout this Article to refer to the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth, and Fifteenth Amendments, which were enacted by Congress and ratified by
the States in the years immediately following the Civil War.
7.
See, e.g., Ari Berman, The Supreme Court Is the Most Important Issue in the 2016 Election,
NATION (Feb. 16, 2016), https://www.thenation.com/article/the-supreme-court-is-the-mostimportant-issue-in-the-2016-election/ [ https://perma.cc/ZJ8V-B2VK ].
8. See, e.g., Dylan Mathews, America After Anthony Kennedy: What Kennedy’s Departure from the
Supreme Court Will Mean for Abortion, Gay Rights, and More, VOX ( last updated June 27, 2018, 2:07
PM ), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/6/25/17461318/anthony-kennedy-ideologyretirement-supreme-court [ https://perma.cc/S58Q-QNU5 ].
9. See, e.g., Tucker Higgins, Supreme Court Nominee Brett Kavanaugh Says Landmark Abortion
Ruling Roe v. Wade Is ‘An Important Precedent,’ CNBC ( last updated Sept. 5, 2018, 3:12 PM ), https:/
/www.cnbc.com/2018/09/05/supreme-court-nominee-brett-kavanaugh-says-landmark-abortionruling-roe-v-wade-is-important-precedent.html [ https://perma.cc/6FSC-SSR9 ].
10. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
11. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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precedent. This process of judicial reconstruction occurs when the Court employs
one or more of three different methods of transforming constitutional doctrine.
First, selective quotation of precedent, in which the Court purports to rely on earlier
precedent via direct quotation but does so in a selective way that distorts, sometimes
dramatically, their actual holdings. Second, re-characterization of precedent, in
which the Court, without directly quoting its earlier decisions, characterizes them as
standing for something quite different than the earlier decisions actually held. Third,
quoting from “dissenting concurrences,” in which the Court quotes not from a
majority opinion but from a separate opinion that is a concurrence in form but a
dissent in substance. Through the use of these methods, Justices are able to
dramatically transform constitutional law even when their decisions are
unsupported by and at times diametrically at odds with the Court’s earlier
precedents. These methods have been used by liberal and conservative Justices alike
to either expand or contract the scope of various constitutional provisions.
Although others have identified selected instances of the Court engaging in
stealth revision of precedent,12 this is both the first article to provide a detailed
taxonomy of the methods employed and to exhaustively consider their use in
construing the Reconstruction Amendments. It proceeds in three parts. Part I
comprehensively demonstrates how the Court has re-shaped the meaning of the
Reconstruction Amendments through the process of judicial reconstruction. Part II
identifies selected examples of the Court re-shaping other constitutional doctrines
through a similar process. Part III identifies examples of U.S. Supreme Court
decisions that are vulnerable to conservative judicial reconstruction now that
President Trump’s appointments have shifted the Court’s composition in a more
decidedly conservative direction, as well as examples of decisions that would be
vulnerable to liberal judicial reconstruction if the Court’s composition were to shift
in a decidedly liberal direction in the future.
This Article concludes that U.S. Senators and commentators, with their almost
laser-like focus on fidelity to stare decisis during the confirmation process, have
overlooked—and perhaps even fostered—the opaque practice of reconstructing
rather than the transparent process of overruling precedent. It further concludes
that those examining the commitment of judicial nominees to respecting precedent
should examine not merely their formal fidelity to stare decisis but instead their
history of and views on reconstructing precedent.
Such a shift in focus from formal to actual fidelity to precedent will serve two

12. See, e.g., Samuel Estreicher, Federal Power to Regulate Private Discrimination: The Revival of
the Enforcement Clauses of the Reconstruction Era Amendments, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 449, 466–67 (1974)
(asserting that Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co. silently overruled The Civil Rights Cases); Michael
J. Klarman, What’s So Great About Constitutionalism?, 93 NW. U. L. REV. 145, 181 (1998) (contending
that The Slaughter-House Cases were “functionally overruled” by Lochner v. New York). See generally Barry
Friedman, The Wages of Stealth Overruling, 99 GEO. L.J. 1, 9, 12 (2010); Randy J. Kozel, The Scope of
Precedent, 113 MICH. L. REV. 179, 202 (2014); Richard M. Re, Narrowing Precedent in the Supreme Court,
114 COLUM. L. REV. 1861 (2014).
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important purposes. First, assuming nominees answer questions truthfully during
the confirmation process, it will allow Senators, commentators, and the public to
better gauge the nominee’s impact on the future trajectory of constitutional law.
Second, by shedding light on the process of stealth transformation of precedent and
treating it as the equivalent of explicitly overruling precedent, Justices will no longer
be incentivized to engage in the stealth process of reconstructing precedent without
justifying their actions. Instead, when a case arises in which overruling precedent
seems justifiable, they will explicitly overrule the earlier cases and explain their
rationales for doing so instead of hiding behind a formal veil of fidelity to stare decisis
that allows them to depart radically from precedent without justifying their decision
to the public.
I. JUDICIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF THE RECONSTRUCTION AMENDMENTS
The U.S. Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Reconstruction Amendments
has undergone a seismic shift between when the Amendments were ratified and the
present day. The Court’s opinions in the decades immediately following the Civil
War suggested that the Reconstruction Amendments were quite limited in their
reach. In contrast, the Court’s decisions in the 1960s and 1970s suggested that the
Reconstruction Amendments were breathtakingly broad in reach. The Court’s more
recent decisions fall somewhere in between those two poles. But over this entire
period, in which the doctrine changed dramatically, the Court rarely overturned any
of its precedent.
These dramatic shifts in the Court’s precedents interpreting the
Reconstruction Amendments have been accomplished through a stealth process
whereby the Court, instead of overturning inconvenient precedent, reconstructs the
earlier precedent to conform with the direction in which the Court wishes to shift
the doctrine. This process takes place when the Court employs one or more of three
different methods of transforming constitutional doctrine: selective quotation of
precedent, re-characterization of precedent, and quotation from
“dissenting concurrences.”
A. Selective Quotation of Precedent
One of the easiest ways to change the meaning of an earlier precedent to make
it appear to support a new proposition is to directly quote a limited passage from
the earlier decision stripped from its context. Four contemporary U.S. Supreme
Court decisions interpreting the Reconstruction Amendments—Reynolds v. Sims,13
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,14 Loving v. Virginia,15 and Lawrence v. Texas16—are
demonstrative of this technique for transforming constitutional law.

13.
14.
15.
16.

Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
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1. Reynolds and the Fundamental Right to Vote

In Reynolds, the Court declared unconstitutional apportionment plans for
legislative districts in several states on the ground that the populations in the
proposed districts were unequal.17 The Court’s rationale for invalidating the
districting scheme was that the right to vote is a fundamental right protected by the
Equal Protection Clause and that weighing the votes of different people differently
by means of malapportionment was equivalent to denial of the right to vote.18
This was a rather remarkable result given that the Court had previously
rejected arguments that the Fourteenth Amendment in any way protected the right
to vote. Ninety years earlier, the Court in Minor v. Happersett19 rejected a claim that
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or Immunities Clause provided a basis for
declaring unconstitutional state laws preventing women from voting. The Minor
Court identified two structural aspects of the Constitution that made clear that the
Fourteenth Amendment did not in any way protect the right to vote. First, the Court
noted that pursuant to Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state’s
representation in Congress was to be diminished to the extent it denied the right to
vote to males over twenty-one years of age.20 Minor reasoned that the existence of
this penalty-in-representation provision necessarily implied that states remained free
to disenfranchise people.21 Second, the Court noted that Congress and the States
deemed it necessary to adopt the Fifteenth Amendment, which prohibited denial of
the right to vote on the basis of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Minor concluded that if the Fourteenth Amendment already protected the right to
vote generally, the Fifteenth Amendment would have been redundant.22
The Reynolds Court got around the seemingly insurmountable stumbling block
of Minor by ignoring it altogether, not mentioning the case once in the course of its
opinion and leading the dissent to charge that the majority had “disregarded” and
“silently overruled” the decision.23 Instead, the Court relied exclusively on a quote
from an earlier case to support its conclusion that voting is a fundamental right
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause: “Almost a
century ago, in Yick Wo v. Hopkins, the Court referred to ‘the political franchise of
voting’ as ‘a fundamental political right, because preservative of all rights.’”24
Stripped of its context, a reader of the Reynolds opinion would likely assume that the
right to vote was at issue in Yick Wo. However, the case had nothing whatsoever to
do with voting rights. Rather, Yick Wo involved an equal protection challenge to a

17. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 568.
18. See id. at 561–62.
19. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162 (1874).
20. See id. at 174–75.
21. See id. at 174.
22. See id. at 175.
23. See Reynolds, 377 U.S. at 612 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
24. See id. at 562 (majority opinion) (citations omitted) (quoting Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 370 (1886)).
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statute that required laundries to be located in certain types of buildings absent a
waiver.25 Although the statute was facially neutral, every Chinese applicant was
denied a waiver while all but one non-Chinese applicant was granted a waiver.26 The
Court held that the threshold requirement for making out an equal protection claim
is satisfied when a facially neutral law is administered in a discriminatory manner,
and it also appeared to hold that the extreme discriminatory effects of the law,
standing alone, satisfy the threshold requirement of an equal protection claim.27
Yick Wo’s reference to voting was merely one of several examples the Court
gave of ways in which the “nature and theory of our institutions of government”
do not allow for the exercise of arbitrary power.28 Indeed, the Yick Wo Court
acknowledged that voting is “not regarded strictly as a natural right, but as a privilege
merely conceded by society, according to its will.”29 Yet, by selectively quoting from
dicta in Yick Wo, the Reynolds Court effectively overruled its decision in Minor
without so stating and created a new constitutional principle that lacked any support
in precedent. The Court repeated this selective citation of Yick Wo in Harper v.
Virginia State Board of Elections,30 where the Court declared unconstitutional state
poll taxes on the ground that they unconstitutionally denied those who failed to pay
it the fundamental right to vote.31
Thereafter, the Court no longer cited Yick Wo in cases involving the
fundamental right to vote. Having distorted the Yick Wo dicta in Reynolds and
Harper, the Court subsequently cited those two cases,32 in effect laundering their
distortion of precedent through them.
2. Jones and Congressional Power to “Enforce” the Thirteenth Amendment
The Thirteenth Amendment—enacted and ratified in the wake of the Civil
War—contains two sections. Section 1 creates a blanket prohibition on slavery or
involuntary servitude, while Section 2 grants Congress the power to “enforce” the
Thirteenth Amendment by “appropriate legislation.” In one of the earliest decisions
to interpret Section 2, the Court in The Civil Rights Cases33 gave Section 2 a limited
interpretation that caused the constitutional provision to lay largely dormant for
nearly a century. Yet by selectively quoting from The Civil Rights Cases, the Court in
Jones dramatically transformed the scope of congressional power under Section 2.
In The Civil Rights Cases, the U.S. Supreme Court declared unconstitutional
Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which prohibited discrimination
25. See Yick Wo, 118 U.S. at 357.
26. See id. at 374.
27. See id. at 373–74.
28. See id. at 369–70.
29. See id. at 370.
30. Harper v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
31. Id. at 667–68.
32. See, e.g., Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 104–05 (2000); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330,
336 (1972).
33. The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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on the basis of race by places of public accommodation. One argument made in the
case was that Congress was empowered to enact the provisions pursuant to Section
2 of the Thirteenth Amendment. To address this argument, The Civil Rights Cases
Court was willing to assume arguendo that Section 2 empowered Congress to
prohibit not merely slavery itself but also the so-called “badges and incidents of
slavery.”34 Specifically, the Court wrote that “it is assumed, that the power vested in
Congress to enforce the article by appropriate legislation, clothes Congress with
power to pass all laws necessary and proper for abolishing all badges and incidents
of slavery in the United States.”35 Describing this as “the major proposition” at issue
in the case, the Court went on to ask whether or not “the minor proposition [was]
also true, that the denial to any person of admission to the accommodations and
privileges of an inn, a public conveyance, or a theatre, does subject that person to
any form of servitude, or tend to fasten upon him any badge of slavery?”36 The
Court went on to conclude that denial of admission to public accommodations did
not constitute a “badge” or “incident” of slavery, engaging in its own analysis of the
meaning of those terms without any deference to Congress.37 By thus rejecting the
“minor proposition,” the Court was able to avoid directly deciding whether Section
2 even empowered Congress to eradicate the badges and incidents of slavery.
Nearly a century passed before the Court revisited the scope of congressional
power under Section 2. In Jones, the Court considered the constitutionality of a
federal statute that prohibited racial discrimination in the sale or rental of real
property.38 The Jones Court concluded that Congress had the power to enact the
statute pursuant to Section 2. In so holding, the Jones Court made three legal
conclusions: that Section 2 empowered Congress not merely to enact laws regarding
slavery and indentured servitude, but also the badges and incidents thereof;39 that
the Court would defer to Congress’s rational determination that something
constituted a badge or incident of slavery;40 and that Congress’s conclusion that
racial discrimination in the sale or rental of real property was a badge or incident of
slavery was a rational one.41
In support of its first legal conclusion, the Jones Court purported to rely
directly upon The Civil Rights Cases:
“By its own unaided force and effect,” the Thirteenth Amendment
“abolished slavery, and established universal freedom.” Civil Rights Cases.
Whether or not the Amendment itself did any more than that—a question
not involved in this case—it is at least clear that the Enabling Clause of
that Amendment empowered Congress to do much more. For that clause
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 20.
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 20–21.
Id. at 21–25.
See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 412–37 (1968).
See id. at 439–40.
See id. at 440.
See id. at 440–41.
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clothed “Congress with power to pass all laws necessary and proper for
abolishing all badges and incidents of slavery in the United States.”
Ibid. (Emphasis added.)42
Thus, by leaving out the prefatory phrase “it is assumed,” the Jones Court was
able to make it appear as though The Civil Rights Cases provided direct support for
the proposition that Section 2 empowers Congress to enact legislation designed to
abolish the badges and incidents of slavery, a question actually reserved by The Civil
Rights Cases Court.
After concluding that Congress could legislate to abolish the badges and
incidents of slavery, Jones proceeded to make its second legal conclusion: that
“Congress has the power under the Thirteenth Amendment rationally to determine
what are the badges and the incidents of slavery.”43 Unlike for its first conclusion,
however, Jones did not rely on The Civil Rights Cases to support giving deference to
Congress. In fact, Jones ignored the non-deferential approach undertaken in The
Civil Rights Cases and instead based its second conclusion primarily upon remarks
by key members of the Congress that enacted the Thirteenth Amendment.44
For the Jones Court’s third conclusion, that it was rational to treat racial
discrimination in the sale or rental of real property as a badge or incident of slavery,
Jones switched tactics and purported once again to rely directly upon The Civil
Rights Cases:
[T]his Court recognized long ago that, whatever else they may have
encompassed, the badges and incidents of slavery—its “burdens and
disabilities”—included restraints upon “those fundamental rights which
are the essence of civil freedom, namely, the same right . . . to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”
Civil Rights Cases.45
The Jones Court again quoted directly from The Civil Rights Cases in an
accompanying footnote:
[T]he entire Court [in The Civil Rights Cases] agreed upon at least one
proposition: The Thirteenth Amendment authorizes Congress not only to
outlaw all forms of slavery and involuntary servitude but also to eradicate
the last vestiges and incidents of a society half slave and half free, by
securing to all citizens, of every race and color, “the same right to make
and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, give evidence, and to inherit,
purchase, lease, sell and convey property, as is enjoyed by white citizens.”46
Together, these two quotes make it appear as though the Court in The Civil
Rights Cases concluded that restrictions on the sale or rental of real property
constituted a badge or incident of slavery. Yet a closer look at the quoted language

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Id. at 439.
See id. at 440.
See id.
Id. at 441.
Id. at 441 n.78.
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in context paints a starkly different story. In these two quotes, the Court in The Civil
Rights Cases was directly quoting the language of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.
Referencing this Act, the Court in The Civil Rights Cases went on to state:
Whether this legislation was fully authorized by the Thirteenth
Amendment alone, without the support which it afterward received from
the Fourteenth Amendment, after the adoption of which it was re-enacted
with some additions, it is not necessary to inquire. It is referred to for the
purpose of showing that at that time (in 1866) Congress did not assume,
under the authority given by the Thirteenth Amendment, to adjust what
may be called the social rights of men and races in the community.47
In other words, without deciding whether Section 2 of the Thirteenth
Amendment in fact authorized Congress to enact the provisions of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866, the majority in The Civil Rights Cases assumed that the 1866 Act
represented the ceiling on the type of legislation that fell within the scope of
congressional power under Section 2 and concluded that legislation regulating racial
discrimination by places of public accommodation—the subject of the provision of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875 at issue in The Civil Rights Cases—fell outside
that scope.
In sum, through the process of selective quotation, the Court in Jones was able
to transform a precedent that narrowly interpreted congressional power under
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment into one that appeared to provide support
for broad congressional power under that provision.
3. Loving and the Fundamental Right to Marry
In Loving v. Virginia,48 the Court declared unconstitutional on two grounds a
state law criminalizing interracial marriage. Although the Court’s decision focused
primarily on the fact that the statute created a race-based classification that did not
satisfy strict scrutiny under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection
Clause,49 the Court alternatively held that the statute violated the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause because it interfered with the fundamental right
to marry.50
The Court has relied upon the latter holding to justify striking down a variety
of laws restricting the right to marry that do not draw race-based distinctions,
including restrictions on marriage by those who are in arrears of child support
obligations,51 prisoners,52 and same-sex couples.53 Accordingly, the doctrinal
soundness of this entire line of cases is based on the accuracy of Loving’s assertion

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.

The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 22 (1883) (emphasis added).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 7–12.
Id. at 12.
See Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384–87 (1978).
See Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 94–95 (1987).
See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598–99 (2015).
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that the Court had previously recognized marriage to be a freestanding fundamental
right protected by the Due Process Clause.
The Loving Court’s conclusion that marriage is such a right was based almost
exclusively on the Court’s 1942 decision in Skinner v. Oklahoma.54 Specifically,
Loving, quoting directly from Skinner, wrote that “[m]arriage is one of the ‘basic civil
rights of man,’ fundamental to our very existence and survival.”55 Yet a close
examination of Skinner reveals that although the word marriage was mentioned by
the Court in its opinion, the reference to marriage was either dicta or recognition of
marriage not as a freestanding fundamental right but rather a derivative one.
At issue in Skinner was the constitutionality of an Oklahoma law providing for
the sterilization of those convicted for the third time of certain categories of crimes.
The Court held that the law was subject to strict scrutiny because a fundamental
right was involved.56 Specifically, the Skinner Court wrote: “We are dealing here
with legislation which involves one of the basic civil rights of man. Marriage and
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race.”57 While
the reference to procreation in Skinner made sense given that sterilization would
prevent future procreation, the reference to marriage at first glance seems puzzling
because the right to marry was itself not directly involved in the case. The easiest
way to make sense of the reference is to consider that, at the time Skinner was
decided, sex outside of marriage was in most instances criminalized, and thus
marriage served as the sole gateway to engaging in lawful acts of procreation.58 Thus,
because procreation is a fundamental right, marriage—to the extent states choose
through their criminal laws to make it the only lawful gateway to engaging in
procreative activity—is a derivative fundamental right.59 The Court’s subsequent
decision in Zablocki v. Redhail60 appeared to acknowledge the derivative nature of
the marriage right when it cited a state law criminalizing sex outside of marriage in
support of its conclusion that “if appellee’s right to procreate means anything at all,
it must imply some right to enter the only relationship in which the State of
Wisconsin allows sexual relations legally to take place.”61
Accordingly, Skinner’s reference to marriage was either dicta or tied directly to
procreation, and did not provide clear support for the Loving Court’s conclusion
that marriage is a freestanding fundamental right.62 This lends credence to Chief
54. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
55. See Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)).
56. See Skinner, 316 U.S. at 539–42.
57. Id. at 541.
58. See Peter Nicolas, Fundamental Rights in a Post-Obergefell World, 27 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM
331, 345–47 (2016).
59. See id.
60. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
61. Id. at 386 n.11.
62. Save for this isolated, offhanded reference to “marriage,” it is clear from the rest of the
opinion that the only right at issue in the case is procreation. See, e.g., Skinner, 316 U.S. at 536 (describing
the deprivation at issue in the case as “the right to have offspring”); id. at 541 (focusing entirely on
sterilization and its effects on the ability to procreate).
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Justice Robert’s statement in dissent in Obergefell v. Hodges,63 that because the roots
of the right to marry are grounded in the right to procreate, it is problematic to
extend the right to same-sex couples without considering those couples’ inability to
procreate absent the assistance of third persons.64
Yet once Loving broke the connection between marriage and procreation by
referring only to the Skinner Court’s reference to marriage, post-Loving decisions
have consistently treated marriage as a freestanding fundamental right. Indeed,
although Loving was based directly on Skinner’s dicta, post-Loving decisions
describing the types of rights deemed fundamental under the Due Process Clause
treat Skinner and Loving as representing two distinct lines of precedent, with Skinner
cited for the proposition that procreation is a fundamental right and Loving cited for
the proposition that marriage is a fundamental right.65
4. Lawrence and the Role of History Under the Due Process Clause
As indicated in the introduction, Lawrence v. Texas is a rare example of a
modern U.S. Supreme Court case explicitly overruling constitutional precedent. Yet
Lawrence paved the way to overruling Bowers in part by reconstructing other
precedent to suggest that Bowers itself was inconsistent with established doctrine.66
A major point of contention between Lawrence and Bowers was the role that
history should play in the Court’s recognition of unenumerated rights under the
Due Process Clause. In a series of cases decided both prior to and after Bowers, the
Court held that its power to recognize such rights is limited to those “deeply rooted
in this Nation’s history and tradition.”67 Citing this precedent, the Bowers Court
rejected the claim that a right to engage in same-sex sodomy was constitutionally
protected, noting the ancient roots of laws criminalizing sodomy.68 Yet in Lawrence,
Justice Kennedy’s majority opinion criticized the Bowers Court’s historical focus: “In
all events we think that our laws and traditions in the past half century are of most
relevance here . . . . ‘[H]istory and tradition are the starting point but not in all cases
the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.’”69 The Lawrence Court
proceeded to identify more recent legal developments that provided support for
treating same-sex sodomy as a constitutionally protected activity.70
The key to the Lawrence Court’s ability to reject Bowers’s focus on history is the

63. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
64. See id. at 2614 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
65. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102,
116 (1996); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431
U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973).
66. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 577 (2003).
67. E.g., Glucksberg, 521 U.S. at 721; Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977)
(plurality opinion).
68. See Bowers, 478 U.S. 186, 191–94 (1986).
69. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 571–72 (quoting Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 857
(1998) (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
70. See id. at 572–73.
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quoted language describing history and tradition as “the starting point but not in all
cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.” The quote comes
from Justice Kennedy’s concurring opinion in County of Sacramento v. Lewis.71 In
Lewis, all nine Justices rejected a claim that a police officer’s deliberate or reckless
indifference to life while engaged in a high-speed chase in an effort to apprehend a
suspect violated the substantive due process rights of those injured as a result of the
chase, albeit for somewhat different reasons.72 In his concurring opinion in Lewis,
Justice Kennedy first noted his agreement with Justice Scalia’s conclusion that
history and tradition did not support the substantive due process right claimed by
those injured as a result of the high-speed chase.73 This was followed by the language
quoted in Lawrence, which in context makes clear that the quoted language was
intended to narrow, rather than to broaden, the scope of substantive due process:
In the instant case, the authorities cited by Justice Scalia are persuasive,
indicating that we would contradict our traditions were we to sustain the
claims of the respondents.
That said, it must be added that history and tradition are the starting point,
but not in all cases the ending point of the substantive due process inquiry.
There is room as well for an objective assessment of the necessities of law
enforcement, in which the police must be given substantial latitude and
discretion.74
In other words, Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lewis indicated that even if history
and tradition provided support for the claimed right, other considerations, including
the needs of law enforcement, might result in rejection of such a claim. Yet in
Lawrence, he quotes that language out of context, using it to suggest just the
opposite, namely, that the Court can recognize a substantive due process right even
if it lacks support in history and tradition.
B. Re-characterization of Precedent
In each of the examples set forth in Part I.A, the Court relied on convenient
language in earlier decisions stripped of its context to suggest that the earlier
decisions supported the Court’s legal conclusions when they did not. Where such
convenient language is not available, the Court has employed a second method of
reconstructing precedent. With this second method, instead of quoting its earlier
decisions, the Court simply re-characterizes them as standing for a proposition
starkly different from what those earlier decisions actually held.
This method of reconstructing the Court’s decisions interpreting the
Reconstruction Amendments has arisen in three different circumstances. First, in
some cases, the Court re-characterizes the ground upon which an earlier case was

71.
72.
73.
74.

Cty. of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (1998).
Id. at 836.
Id. at 857 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing id. at 860–62 (Scalia, J., concurring)).
Id.
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decided, such as by citing a case formally decided on equal protection grounds as
though it were instead decided on due process grounds. Second, the Court
re-characterizes earlier cases that applied a lower level of scrutiny, typically rational
basis review, as though they instead applied a more searching form of scrutiny.
Third, the Court alters the parameters of an established constitutional doctrine or
test by re-casting earlier decisions as requiring some key element even though those
earlier decisions placed no weight on that element.
Using these various methods of re-characterizing precedent, the Court is often
able to blaze new legal pathways or narrow the scope of constitutional provisions
while making it appear as though they are simply applying binding precedent. In
some instances, this process is abrupt, with a later case describing a predecessor case
in starkly different terms. In other instances, this process is more gradual, with one
or more intermediary cases helping to slowly transition the meaning of the root case.
1. Re-characterizing Ground: The Development of Modern Substantive Due
Process Jurisprudence
Contemporary U.S. Supreme Court decisions acknowledging the Court’s
authority to recognize and enforce unenumerated substantive fundamental rights
under the Due Process Clause often cite the same seven cases in support of this
proposition: Meyer v. Nebraska,75 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,76 Skinner v. Oklahoma,77
Prince v. Massachusetts,78 Griswold v. Connecticut,79 Loving v. Virginia,80 and Eisenstadt
v. Baird.81 For example, in Carey v. Population Services International82—a case
recognizing an unenumerated right to procure an abortion—the Court wrote:
[T]he Court has recognized that one aspect of the “liberty” protected by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment is “a right of
personal privacy, or a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy.” Roe
v. Wade . . . . While the outer limits of this aspect of privacy have not been
marked by the Court, it is clear that among the decisions that an individual
may make without unjustified government interference are personal
decisions “relating to marriage, Loving v. Virginia; procreation, Skinner
v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson; contraception, Eisenstadt v. Baird; family
relationships, Prince v. Massachusetts, and child rearing and education, Pierce
v. Society of Sisters; Meyer v. Nebraska.”83
Similar citations to these cases can be found in other contemporary Supreme

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
Id. at 684–85 (1977) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-53 (1973)) (citations omitted).
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Court decisions adjudicating other claimed substantive due process rights.84 Yet a
closer look at these seven precedents will reveal that they in fact provide little direct
support for the modern theory of recognizing and enforcing unenumerated
substantive rights under the Due Process Clause. Two of the cases—Skinner and
Eisenstadt—were formally decided on class-based equal protection grounds. Two of
the other cases—Meyer and Pierce—were formally based on subsequently repudiated
Lochner-era precedents interpreting the Due Process Clause to protect “freedom of
contract.” The remaining three cases—Prince, Griswold, and Loving—were
themselves re-characterizations of one or more of the first four cases.
a. A Shift from Equality to Liberty: The Skinner and Eisenstadt Cases
As shown in Part I.A.3, by selectively quoting from the Court’s decision in
Skinner, the Loving Court was able to recognize a freestanding fundamental right to
marry, even though Skinner was a case about procreation. As the quote above from
Carey demonstrates, post-Loving the Court treated Skinner and Loving as separate
lines of precedent, with Skinner representing the right to procreate and Loving
representing the right to marry.85 Yet recognition of a freestanding right to marry is
not the only way in which Loving reconstructed Skinner. In addition to selectively
quoting from Skinner, Loving also significantly re-characterized the ground upon
which the case was decided.
As explained above, the Court’s decision in Loving rested on two grounds.
First, that the anti-miscegenation statute created a race-based classification that did
not satisfy strict scrutiny under the Equal Protection Clause.86 And second, that the
statute violated the Due Process Clause because it interfered with the fundamental
right to marry.87 It was in the second section of the Court’s opinion regarding the
Due Process Clause that the Court quoted Skinner.88
However, the Skinner decision was decided on equal protection, not due
process, grounds. Recall that at issue in Skinner was the constitutionality of an
Oklahoma law providing for the sterilization of those convicted for the third time
of certain categories of crimes. Skinner treated the statute as presenting an equal
protection problem, focusing on the fact that the statute encompassed only certain
types of crimes, such as grand larceny, but not others, such as embezzlement.89
While acknowledging that the distinction between different types of crimes would
satisfy the rational basis review normally applicable in equal protection challenges,

84. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997) (physician-assisted suicide);
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986) (sexual autonomy); Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur,
414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974) (right of pregnant public employees to continue working).
85. Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977) (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 152–53 (1973)) (citations omitted).
86. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 7–12 (1967).
87. See id. at 12.
88. See id.
89. See Skinner v. Oklahoma ex rel. Williamson, 316 U.S. 535, 541–42 (1942).
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the Court held that strict scrutiny applied where, as here, a fundamental right
was involved.90
To be sure, separate concurring opinions in Skinner suggested that the case
presented either a substantive or a procedural due process problem rather than an
equal protection one,91 but the majority opinion clearly and unmistakably decided
the case on equal protection grounds.92 And although the Skinner majority
recognized the right involved as a fundamental one, the Court’s jurisprudence has
made an important distinction between fundamental rights recognized under the
Due Process Clause and those recognized under the Equal Protection Clause. If a
right is recognized as fundamental under the Due Process Clause, infringement of
that right is subject to heightened scrutiny even if the government even-handedly
infringes upon everyone’s exercise of that right.93 In contrast, fundamental rights
protected by the Equal Protection Clause can be infringed upon or even eliminated
by the government without raising any constitutional concerns, so long as the
government does so in an even-handed manner.94 Only if it infringes upon or denies
the right to some individuals but not others is the government’s conduct subject to
heightened scrutiny.95 Thus, Loving’s re-casting of Skinner as a due process rather
than an equal protection fundamental rights case significantly alters the scope of
the constitutional protection afforded by the right. Post-Loving, the Court has
carried this re-characterization of Skinner forward by consistently treating it as a due
process precedent rather than an equal protection one.96
The Court’s decision in Eisenstadt—cited in Carey for the proposition that the
Due Process Clause protects personal decisions related to contraception—likewise
provides little direct support for modern substantive due process jurisprudence.
Eisenstadt was decided after the Court’s decision in Griswold. In Griswold, the Court
declared unconstitutional a Connecticut law that criminalized both the use of
contraceptives by married persons and the distribution of contraceptives to such
persons.97 Although Griswold invalidated the law, the Justices did not coalesce on a
basis for doing so. The plurality eschewed reliance on the Due Process Clause,
90. See id. at 539–42.
91. See id. at 543–45 (Stone, C.J., concurring); id. at 546–47 ( Jackson, J., concurring).
92. Skinner was decided just a few years after the Court overruled its Lochner-era line of cases,
and thus the Justices in the majority may have invoked the Equal Protection rather than the Due Process
Clause to avoid accusations of a return to Lochner. See Kenneth L. Karst, The Liberties of Equal
Citizens: Groups and the Due Process Clause, 55 UCLA L. REV. 99, 112, 123 (2007); G. Edward White,
The Anti-Judge: William O. Douglas and the Ambiguities of Individuality, 74 VA. L. REV. 17,
65–72 (1988).
93. See Nicolas, supra note 58, at 354.
94. See id. at 358–59.
95. See id.
96. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2854, 2598 (2015); Washington v. Glucksberg, 521
U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 190 (1986); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l,
431 U.S. 678, 684–85 (1977); Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 499 (1977); Cleveland Bd.
of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, 639–40 (1974); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 169 (1973) (Stewart,
J., concurring).
97. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
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invoking instead what it described as the “penumbras” of the Bill of Rights to
recognize a fundamental right to marital privacy,98 while the concurring opinions
invoked the Ninth Amendment99 and the Due Process Clause.100
Eisenstadt, decided seven years after Griswold, involved a challenge to the
constitutionality of a Massachusetts law that also regulated the use and distribution
of contraceptives. The Massachusetts statute permitted contraceptive use by and
distribution to married persons, but it prohibited their use by and distribution to
unmarried persons.101 Thus, the case was arguably distinguishable from Griswold in
that no claim to marital privacy could be made.
Although Eisenstadt hinted that the fundamental right recognized in Griswold
might logically be extended to unmarried couples—thus requiring strict scrutiny of
the law at issue—the Court made it clear that it was instead deciding the case on
class-based equal protection grounds.102 Indeed, the Court was so clear that it was
not deciding the case on due process grounds that this language has been described
as “well-known dictum.”103 Purporting to apply no more than rational basis review,
the Eisenstadt Court declared the Massachusetts law unconstitutional on the ground
that it irrationally discriminated between married and unmarried persons.104
Yet despite the clear basis for the Court’s decision in Eisenstadt, it took the
Court just ten months to re-characterize its holding. In Roe v. Wade,105 the Court
considered the constitutionality of a pair of state laws restricting or regulating
abortion. The Court noted that its previous cases had recognized a right to personal
privacy, although it indicated that there was some uncertainty in the Court’s earlier
decisions as to whether the source of that right was the penumbras of the Bill of
Rights, the Ninth Amendment, or the Due Process Clause.106 Roe ultimately
resolved that uncertainty by identifying the Due Process Clause as the source of that
right.107 Among the list of cases that Roe cited in support of its conclusion was
Eisenstadt, which it represented as recognizing a fundamental right to
contraception.108 The specific pinpoint cite in Roe directs to the section of the
Eisenstadt opinion in which the Court, in dicta, made reference to the colorable

98. See id. at 484–86 (majority opinion).
99.
See id. at 486–99 (Goldberg, J., concurring).
100. See id. at 499–500 (Harlan, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 502–08 (White, J.,
concurring in the judgment).
101. See Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 442 (1972).
102. See id. at 446–47, 447 n.7, 452–55.
103. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 595 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
104. See Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 446–47, 447 n.7, 454. One may rightly be skeptical of the
Eisenstadt Court’s claim that it was applying only rational basis scrutiny. The Court applied a far more
exacting standard to the rationales proffered by the government than is the norm under traditional
rational basis review, rejecting them on the ground that the means-end fit was too loose. See Eisenstadt,
405 U.S. at 447–52.
105. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
106. See id. at 152.
107. See id. at 153.
108. See id. at 152.

First to Printer_Nicolas.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/30/20 4:13 PM

954

[Vol. 10:937

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

argument that Griswold might be extended to unmarried persons.109
Post-Roe, the Court has consistently treated Eisenstadt as a due process
precedent despite Eisenstadt’s explicit reliance on class-based equal protection
principles. In some of these post-Roe cases, the Court has briefly mentioned the fact
that Eisenstadt was formally decided on equal protection grounds110 but
characterized it as explicitly or implicitly grounded as well in due process
principles.111 However, in most cases, the Court simply has cited Eisenstadt in
support of either the general proposition that the Due Process Clause protects a
right to privacy112 or for the more specific proposition that it protects a right
to contraception.113
In sum, two of the seven cases cited in support of the modern theory of
recognizing and enforcing fundamental rights under the Due Process
Clause—Skinner and Eisenstadt—are actually equal protection precedents and do
not support the proposition set forth in cases such as Carey. Moreover, a third case
cited in support of the modern theory of substantive due process—Loving—was
itself based upon a multi-faceted reconstruction of Skinner, and it is likewise subject
to the same taint.
b. Lochner Re-Incarnated: The Meyer and Pierce Cases
In Lochner v. New York,114 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment protected “liberty of contract,” leading the
Court to declare that a state labor law limiting the number of hours per day and per
week bakery employees could work impermissibly interfered with the liberty of
employers and employees to contract with one another.115 Lochner was part of an
important line of cases that struck down hundreds of federal and state laws in the
early 20th century116 until the line of decisions was ultimately overruled.117 Not only
was Lochner overruled, but as will be demonstrated in Part I.C.1, the now-repudiated
Lochner line of cases were themselves a result of dramatic judicial reconstruction of
109. See id. (citing Eisenstadt, 405 U.S. at 453–54).
110. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2604 (2015); Lawrence v. Texas, 539
U.S. 558, 565 (2003); Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 849
(1992); Carey v. Population Servs. Int’l, 431 U.S. 678, 686–87 (1977).
111. See, e.g., Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2604; Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 565; Casey, 505 U.S. at 851;
Carey, 431 U.S. at 687.
112. See, e.g., M.L.B. v. S.L.J., 519 U.S. 102, 114 n.6 (1996); Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497
U.S. 417, 434 (1990); Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 772
(1986); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 427 (1983); Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 177 (1976); Vill. of Belle Terre v. Boraas, 416 U.S. 1, 16 (1974); United States
v. Orito, 413 U.S. 139, 142 (1973); Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 65 (1973); United States
v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434, 444 (1973).
113. See, e.g., Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478
U.S. 186, 190 (1986); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 385 (1978).
114. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
115. See id. at 45–65.
116. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2617 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
117. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 390–97 (1937).
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earlier precedent. Thus, because of both Lochner’s shaky foundation and its ultimate
overruling, precedents grounded in Lochner are on an unstable footing. Yet two of
the key cases forming the basis of modern substantive due process
jurisprudence—Meyer and Pierce—are direct outgrowths of Lochner. Moreover, two
additional cases—Prince and Griswold—justified their holdings by reliance on
judicial reconstructions of Meyer and Pierce and are thus subject to the same taint.
In Meyer, the Court declared unconstitutional a Nebraska law that made it a
crime to teach foreign languages to students who had not yet completed eighth
grade.118 In Pierce, decided two years later, the Court struck down an Oregon law
requiring children between the ages of 8 and 16 to attend public (as opposed to
private) schools.119 The decisions, which were issued in the midst of the Lochner era
and penned by Justice McReynolds—a staunch advocate of the view that the Due
Process Clause protected “freedom of contract”120—appeared at the time to be
primarily grounded in that theory. Meyer cited Lochner and a variety of other
Lochner-era decisions and then spoke of the rights of the foreign-language teacher
to sell his services and the parents to purchase them, concluding that “[h]is right
thus to teach and the right of parents to engage him so to instruct their children, we
think, are within the liberty of the amendment.”121 And Pierce focused on the impact
that the law would have on the private school litigants challenging the law, noting
that its enforcement would “seriously impair, perhaps destroy, the profitable
features of [their] business and greatly diminish the value of their property”122 and
writing of the Due Process Clause “protect[ing] business enterprises against
interference with the freedom of patrons or customers.”123 Thus, just as in Lochner,
the Court’s focus was on the freedom of people to purchase and sell one another’s
labor free of governmental interference.
Yet both cases also had something in common with Skinner and Eisenstadt
that made them prime targets for subsequent judicial reconstruction: broad dicta
unnecessary to the decisions. In Skinner, it was a reference to marriage, while in
Eisenstadt, it was a brief mention of the colorable claim that Griswold’s fundamental
rights holding might extend to unmarried persons. In Meyer, the broad dicta
involved the Court’s general discussion of the “liberty” guaranteed by the Due
Process Clause:
[I]t denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of
the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of
life, to acquire useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up
children, to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience,
and generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as

118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 403 (1923).
See Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925).
See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 514–16 (1965) (Black, J., dissenting).
See Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399–400.
See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 531.
Id. at 536 (citations omitted).
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essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness by free men.124
And Pierce wrote more broadly that the laws at issue in both Meyer and Pierce
“interfere[ ] with the liberty of parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and
education of children under their control.”125 This was not merely dicta but also
dicta lacking any foundation in precedent: not one of the cases cited in Meyer made
any reference—direct or indirect—to marriage, freedom of religion, or parental
control over their children, and Pierce cited nothing but Meyer in support of its broad
statement regarding parental control.126
Because Lochner and its progeny were ultimately overruled, Meyer and Pierce
could remain viable precedent only if they were severed from their roots in those
decisions. The process of reconstructing Meyer and Pierce began as early as
1938—one year after Lochner was overruled—and has continued into the present.
Indeed, the Court’s short opinions in Meyer and Pierce hold the record for the
number of times a decision has been judicially reconstructed.
The first case to re-characterize the decisions was United States v. Carolene
Products.127 Carolene Products was part of a series of decisions endorsing highly
deferential rational basis review of equal protection challenges,128 a development
parallel to the Court’s return to highly deferential rational basis review under the
Due Process Clause in its retreat from Lochner the year before. At the same time,
Carolene Products dropped a famous footnote indicating that the level of judicial
scrutiny might be higher when, inter alia, a law targeted minority groups.129 In so
holding, Carolene Products invoked both Meyer and Pierce. Specifically, the
Court wrote:
Nor need we enquire whether similar considerations enter into the review
of statutes directed at particular religious, Pierce v. Society of Sisters, or
national, Meyer v. Nebraska, or racial minorities; whether prejudice against
discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to
be relied upon to protect minorities, and which may call for a
correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry.130
Carolene Products thus re-characterized Pierce and Meyer as equal protection
(rather than due process) cases calling for heightened scrutiny where discrimination
on the bases of religion and national origin are involved, despite the absence of any
such characterization in the decisions themselves.
Six years after issuing its opinion in Carolene Products, the Court once again

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.
130.

Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399 (citations omitted).
See Pierce, 268 U.S. at 534–35.
See id.; Meyer, 262 U.S. at 399.
United States v. Carolene Products, 304 U.S. 144 (1938).
See id. at 151–54.
See id. at 152 n.4.
Id.
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re-characterized Meyer and Pierce. At issue in Prince131 was the constitutionality of
applying child labor laws to a Jehovah’s Witness who claimed that doing so violated
her religious convictions.132 In the course of considering that claim, the
Court—relying on the broad, unsupported dicta in Meyer and Pierce—characterized
those decisions as together having “respected the private realm of family life which
the state cannot enter.”133
About two decades later, the Court in Griswold, for the third time,
re-characterized the Meyer and Pierce decisions. The Griswold Court addressed the
constitutionality of a law punishing people who used contraceptives and those who
aided and abetted people in doing the same.134 Eschewing reliance on Lochner,135
the Court plurality instead held that it was relying on the “penumbras” of the Bill
of Rights that create a constitutionally protected zone of privacy.136 To support its
conclusion, the plurality re-characterized Meyer and Pierce as incorporating and
applying the penumbras of the First Amendment to the states:
By Pierce v. Society of Sisters, the right to educate one’s children as one
chooses is made applicable to the States by the force of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments. By Meyer v. State of Nebraska, the same dignity
is given the right to study the German language in a private school.137
The Griswold plurality’s reconstruction of Meyer and Pierce was not only
divorced from the actual holdings in those cases, but it was also inconsistent with
the state of the law at the time of those decisions. For it was not until several decades
after those cases were decided that the Court ultimately ruled that the First
Amendment right was incorporated and applied against the states via the
Fourteenth Amendment.138 Thus, it is not surprising that the separate opinions in
Griswold characterized the holdings in those cases differently. Justice Goldberg’s
concurring opinion followed the Prince Court’s characterization of them as having
“respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot enter.”139 Justice
White’s concurring opinion relied on the broader language used in Meyer and Pierce,
citing them for the specific propositions that the Fourteenth Amendment’s
guarantee of liberty “includes the right ‘to marry, establish a home, and bring up
children’” and the right “to direct the upbringing and education of children,”
respectively.140 In contrast, Justice Black, in his dissenting opinion, characterized
131. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
132. See id. at 159–64.
133. Id. at 166.
134. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 480 (1965).
135. See id. at 481–82.
136. See id. at 484.
137. Id. at 482 (citations omitted).
138. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 764 n.12 (2010) (citations omitted); see also
Griswold, 381 U.S. at 516 (Black, J., dissenting).
139. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (quoting Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 158 (1944)).
140. Id. at 502 (White, J., concurring) (first quoting Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399
(1923); then quoting Pierce v. Soc’y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534–35 (1925)).
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the cases as being Lochner-era decisions grounded in liberty of contract.141
Given these various characterizations of the Meyer and Pierce decisions—which
sometimes, as in Griswold, occur even within the same case—it is thus not surprising
that subsequent decisions have cited the cases for a variety of different propositions.
The Court’s decision in Roe described the pair of cases as recognizing that decisions
by parents regarding “child rearing and education” are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment.142 The Court’s decisions in Loving, Zablocki, and
Obergefell—recognizing a fundamental right to marry that includes, respectively,
interracial marriage, marriage by those who have outstanding child support
obligations, and same-sex marriage—each cited Meyer for the proposition that the
right to “marry” is a fundamental one protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.143
And the Court’s 2000 decision in Troxel v. Granville144 described them as standing
for “the [liberty] interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of
their children.”145
In sum, although Meyer and Pierce are part and parcel of the now discredited
Lochner line of cases, they have been divorced from their roots in those precedents
as a result of multiple instances of re-characterization. They, along with Prince and
Griswold—which themselves re-characterized Meyer and Pierce—as well as Skinner,
Eisenstadt, and Loving, are consistently presented by the Court in support of the
contemporary approach to recognizing and enforcing substantive fundamental
rights under the Due Process Clause. Yet as shown above, upon closer scrutiny,
none of these precedents actually stood for the proposition for which they are cited
in contemporary decisions.
2. Re-characterizing Level of Scrutiny: The Sex and Legitimacy Classification Cases
For approximately the first one hundred years after the Reconstruction
Amendments were ratified, the U.S. Supreme Court consistently upheld laws that
drew sex-based distinctions, applying only highly deferential rational basis scrutiny
to such laws when they were challenged on equal protection grounds.146 In 1971,
the Court in Reed v. Reed147 for the first time declared unconstitutional on equal
protection grounds a law that treated men and women differently. At issue in Reed
was the constitutionality of an Idaho statute providing that when two people are
otherwise equally entitled to appointment as the administrator of an estate, a male

141. Id. at 514–16, 516 n.7 (Black, J., dissenting).
142. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973).
143. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2598 (2015); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384
(1978); Loving, 388 U.S. 1, 7 (1967).
144. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000).
145. Id. at 65.
146. See, e.g., Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57, 69 (1961); Goesaert v. Clearly, 335 U.S. 464, 467
(1948); Breedlove v. Suttles, 302 U.S. 277, 283–84 (1937); Quong Wing v. Kirkendall, 223 U.S. 59,
63 (1912).
147. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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applicant must be preferred to a female one.148 Yet, Reed did not purport to apply
anything higher than rational basis scrutiny, stating that the relevant test was
whether the classification at issue “bears a rational relationship to a state
objective”149 and concluding that the law at issue failed that test.150
Two years later, a plurality of the Court in Frontiero v. Richardson151
re-characterized Reed as having applied heightened equal protection scrutiny by
focusing on what Reed did rather than what it explicitly held. Frontiero noted that the
party defending the Idaho statute’s constitutionality in Reed sought to rationalize in
its brief before the Court the sex-based distinction in the law on the ground that
“men [are] as a rule are more conversant in business affairs than . . . women,” a basis
similar to that upon which the Idaho Supreme Court upheld the statute’s
constitutionality.152 The Frontiero plurality described Reed as having “implicitly
rejected appellee’s apparently rational explanation of the statutory scheme,”153
which the plurality described as a “departure from ‘traditional’ rational-basis
analysis,”154 and concluded that strict scrutiny was the appropriate standard for
sex-based classifications.155 Yet, just three years later, a majority of the Court in
Craig v. Boren156 announced a new standard for assessing sex-based equal protection
challenges and, in so doing, again re-characterized Reed. The Craig Court declared
that “previous cases establish that classifications by gender must serve important
governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those
objectives” and cited Reed as an example, among others, of such a case.157 This is so
despite the fact that neither Reed nor any other case used any such language, leading
the dissent to state that the newly announced intermediate scrutiny test “apparently
comes out of thin air” and to note that “none of our previous cases adopt
that standard.”158
In the decades following Craig, the Court’s sex-based equal protection
jurisprudence has undergone a tug-of-war between shifting majorities, with the
decisions at times pulling the standard in the direction of either strict or rational
basis scrutiny. In Craig itself, for example, Justice Powell characterized the standard
differently, writing that “the relatively deferential ‘rational basis’ standard of review
normally applied takes on a sharper focus when we address a gender-based
classification.”159 A few years after Craig was decided, the Court in Personnel

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

Id. at 72–73.
Id. at 76.
Id. at 76–77.
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677 (1973).
Id. at 683 (footnote omitted).
Id.
Id. at 684.
Id. at 688.
Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
Id. at 197–98 (citations omitted).
Id. at 220 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
Id. at 210 n.* (Powell, J., concurring).
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Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney160 wrote after citing the intermediate scrutiny
test announced in Craig that any law preferring males over females would thus
require an “exceedingly persuasive justification.”161 In context and as subsequently
noted by Chief Justice Rehnquist, this phrase was used “as an observation on the
difficulty of meeting the applicable test, not as a formulation of the test itself.”162
Yet soon after Feeney was decided, the Court, through the process of judicial
reconstruction by means of selective quotation (examined above in Part I.A),
attributed greater significance to this phrase, with majority opinions suggesting that
a standard higher than intermediate scrutiny might be applicable to sex-based
classifications. Thus, in both Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan163 and United
States v. Virginia,164 the majority opinions included that phrase as part of the test
itself, indicated that the language required the government to show “at least” that
the classification served important governmental objectives and that the means
employed are substantially related to achieving those objectives, and left open the
question whether such classifications should instead be subject to strict scrutiny.165
Indeed, so exacting was the scrutiny applied by the majority in Virginia itself that
the dissent accused the majority of de facto applying strict scrutiny.166 Although
post-Virginia a Court majority appeared to apply a more relaxed form of review
than was employed in Virginia,167 it has since applied a heightened standard
consistent with that employed in Virginia.168
The Court followed a similar process with its cases involving classifications
based on legitimacy. When the Court initially struck down laws discriminating
against those born out of wedlock, it purported to apply nothing stronger than
rational basis review.169 Because the Court purported to apply only rational basis
review, during this initial period, the Court would at times uphold laws
discriminating on this basis that were justified by tenuous rationales.170 The Court
subsequently indicated that the standard of constitutional scrutiny for laws
discriminating on the basis of legitimacy was not a “toothless one”171 and
occasionally incorporated some intermediate scrutiny lingo when applying the

160. Adm’r of Mass.v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979).
161. Id. at 273.
162. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 559 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
163. Miss. Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718 (1982).
164. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515.
165. Id. at 532–33, 532 n.6 (citations omitted); Hogen, 458 U.S. at 723–24, 724 n.9
(citations omitted).
166. See Virginia, 518 U.S. at 570–74 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
167. Compare Nguyen v. Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 533 U.S. 53, 60–71 (2001), with
Virginia, 518 U.S. at 574–94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
168. See Sessions v. Morales-Santana, 137 S. Ct. 1678, 1689–90 (2017).
169. See Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Ins. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972); Glona
v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73, 75 (1968); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 71 (1968).
170. See, e.g., Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 536 n.6 (1971).
171. Matthews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 510 (1977).
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standard.172 Subsequently, just as the Court did with sex discrimination in Craig, the
Court in Clark v. Jeter173 ultimately re-characterized these earlier cases as in fact
applying intermediate scrutiny.174
These two lines of cases contained key elements that made them ripe for
subsequent judicial reconstruction. In both lines of cases, the cases, like the Court’s
decision in Eisenstadt, explicitly used rational basis lingo and purported to apply
nothing more than rational basis scrutiny. Yet because the decisions in one or more
ways departed from the deferential approach associated with rational basis review,
one can re-cast them as in fact applying some higher level of scrutiny if one focuses
on what the cases did rather than what they actually said. Indeed, a Justice bent on
changing the level of scrutiny associated with a particular type of classification (but
who lacks the votes to do so) could plant the seeds for later re-characterization by
drafting an opinion that in form purports to apply one level of scrutiny but that in
practice applies a different level of scrutiny. Later, when the Court’s composition
changes, that opinion can be cited for its substance rather than its form, allowing
the Court to appear as though it is merely following rather than
overruling precedent.
3. Re-characterizing Parameters of Constitutional Doctrine: The Reordering of the Political
Process Doctrine
What has been referred to as the Court’s “restructuring”175 or “reordering”176
of the political process doctrine has changed significantly over time as the Court
has engaged more than once in the process of re-characterizing its precedents in an
effort to either narrow or broaden the doctrine’s scope.
The first significant case in this line of cases does not mention any such
doctrine. In Reitman v. Mulkey,177 the Court addressed the constitutionality of an
amendment to California’s constitution that was enacted directly by voters in that
state as a response to laws enacted by the state legislature that prohibited private
discrimination in the sale or lease of residential housing.178 The challenge was
brought under the Equal Protection Clause, alleging that the enactment of the
constitutional amendment and its concomitant invalidation of state laws prohibiting
private race-based discrimination in the sale or rental of residential housing
constituted racial discrimination that violated the Equal Protection Clause.179
Making out a claim that the constitutional amendment involved the state in
172. See, e.g., Mills v. Habluetzel, 456 U.S. 91, 99 (1982).
173. Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456 (1988).
174. See id. (first citing Mills, 456 U.S. at 99; then citing Matthews, 427 U.S. at 505–06).
175. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 625 (1996); Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458
U.S. 457, 485–86 n.29 (1982).
176. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291, 336 (2014) (Breyer, J.,
concurring in the judgment); id. at 357, 364–65 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting); Washington, 458 U.S. at 479.
177. Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369 (1967).
178. Id. at 370–75.
179. Id. at 370–81.
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race-based discrimination presented a challenge because in terms the amendment
was race-neutral, providing as follows:
Neither the State nor any subdivision or agency thereof shall deny, limit or
abridge, directly or indirectly, the right of any person, who is willing or
desires to sell, lease or rent any part or all of his real property, to decline to
sell, lease or rent such property to such person or persons as he, in his
absolute discretion, chooses.180
Thus, while it was true that the effect of the state constitutional amendment
was to repeal (and prevent the re-enactment of) laws prohibiting race-based
discrimination in the sale or lease of residential property, the amendment was more
general in nature and likewise prevented the enactment of a variety of
non-race-based laws regulating the sale or lease of real property.
Nonetheless, Reitman invalidated the amendment, deeming it to be race-based
discrimination by the state in violation of the Equal Protection Clause. The Court
acknowledged that “mere repeal” of a law prohibiting racial discrimination would
not, standing alone, violate the Equal Protection Clause.181 However, deferring to
findings made by the California Supreme Court, the U.S. Supreme Court concluded
that the amendment was unconstitutional because instead of taking a neutral
position on the question of racial discrimination, the law was designed to actively
encourage such acts of private racial discrimination.182 This finding that the
amendment was tacitly designed to encourage private racial discrimination was
critical to the Court’s decision. Under longstanding precedent, the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment are applicable only to action attributable to the
government; purely private conduct is outside the Amendment’s scope.183 Thus, the
private acts of racial discrimination by those selling or leasing real property, standing
alone, could not constitute an Equal Protection claim. However, pre-Reitman cases
made clear that governmental action designed to encourage private racial
discrimination could be challenged on equal protection grounds.184 Reitman relied
on those precedents, coupled with the finding that such encouragement was at play
in the case, to conclude that the state constitutional amendment was invalid.185
Two years later, in Hunter v. Erickson,186 the Court began to sketch out what
would become the reordering of the political process doctrine. In Hunter, an
African-American woman brought a complaint to the City of Akron’s Commission
on Equal Opportunity in Housing, alleging that a real estate agent refused to show
her houses because of her race and seeking enforcement of the city’s fair housing

180. Id. at 371 (quoting CAL. CONST. art. I, § 26).
181. Id. at 376–77.
182. Id. at 374–81.
183. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 621–23 (2000); The Civil Rights Cases, 109
U.S. 3, 10–14 (1883).
184. See, e.g., Anderson v. Martin, 375 U.S. 399 (1964).
185. See Reitman, 387 U.S. at 374–81.
186. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969).
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ordinance.187 The Commission replied that she was no longer protected by the city’s
fair housing ordinance because voters had amended the city’s charter to provide
that no existing or future law regulating real property transactions on the basis of,
inter alia, race was effective unless first approved by the city’s voters.188 The
aggrieved woman brought a lawsuit against the City of Akron, seeking a declaration
that the charter amendment violated the Equal Protection Clause. In the lower
courts189 and in her brief filed in the U.S. Supreme Court,190 her attorneys argued
that the charter amendment was analogous to the state constitutional amendment
at issue in Reitman and should likewise be struck down, focusing on the
comparatively greater burden that racial minorities faced in re-enacting such laws.
The Court agreed that the charter amendment was unconstitutional.191
However, in responding to the City’s claim that Reitman was distinguishable, the
Court said that it need not rely on Reitman’s finding of a discriminatory purpose
underlying a facially neutral constitutional amendment because the charter
amendment at issue in Hunter was not facially neutral; it treated racial housing
matters differently from other racial and housing matters.192 According to the
Hunter majority and the concurring opinion, the constitutional problem with the
city charter amendment was that it made it comparatively more difficult for those
seeking to advance housing laws targeting racial discrimination.193 After the city
charter amendment was passed, future laws addressing most housing matters would
go into effect upon approval by the City Council, but those involving racial housing
matters had to undergo the additional step of getting voter approval before taking
effect.194 Moreover, even though the charter amendment applied with equal force
to laws that would protect white people from racial discrimination, the Court
reasoned that the law was still not racially neutral:
[A]lthough the law on its face treats Negro and white, Jew and gentile in
an identical manner, the reality is that the law’s impact falls on the minority.
The majority needs no protection against discrimination and if it did, a
referendum might be bothersome but no more than that . . . . [The charter
amendment] places special burdens on racial minorities within the
governmental process.195
The third key case in this line of decisions was the Court’s 1982 decision in
Washington v. Seattle School District No. 1.196 At issue in Seattle was the

187. Id. at 387.
188. Id.
189. See State ex rel. Hunter v. Erickson, 233 N.E.2d 129, 131 (Ohio 1967).
190. See Brief for Appellant, Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385 (1969) (No. 63), 1968 WL
1125644, at *20–24.
191. Hunter, 393 U.S. at 392–93.
192. Id. at 393.
193. See id. at 390–93; id. at 395 (Harlan, J., concurring).
194. See Hunter, 393 U.S. at 390.
195. Id. at 391.
196. Washington v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 458 U.S. 457 (1982).
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constitutionality of a Washington State citizen initiative that the state’s voters
approved in response to the City of Seattle’s racially integrative school busing
plan.197 Like the constitutional amendment struck down in Reitman, the initiative in
Seattle was facially race-neutral, providing that “no school board . . . shall directly or
indirectly require any student to attend a school other than the school which is
geographically nearest or next nearest the student’s place of residence . . . and which
offers the course of study pursued by such student.”198 The initiative contained a
laundry list of exceptions, however, that largely left local school boards free to
re-assign students for virtually any purpose other than voluntary (i.e., non-court
mandated) racial integration.199
Relying almost exclusively on Hunter—without any mention of
Reitman—Seattle declared the state initiative unconstitutional on equal protection
grounds. Seattle first brushed aside an effort to distinguish Hunter on the ground
that the city charter amendment in Hunter was facially discriminatory on race while
the Washington initiative was race neutral. Citing the structure of the initiative and
the context of the political campaign to approve it, the Court concluded that the
initiative was race-based action for equal protection purposes because it was clearly
motivated by the effect it would have on racially integrative busing.200 Moreover,
the Court rejected the argument that it was race neutral because it impacted people
of all races, noting that “desegregation of the public schools, like the Akron open
housing ordinance, at bottom inures primarily to the benefit of the minority, and is
designed for that purpose.”201 It then concluded that the constitutional infirmity
was the same in both cases: the power to address discrete minority interests was
placed at a different level of government where it was harder to achieve success.202
According to Seattle, this “comparative structural burden placed on the political
achievement of minority interests” rendered the initiative unconstitutional.203
Although these three cases have much in common with one another, the
decisions remained at the time of Seattle only loosely tied together. Hunter made only
a brief reference to Reitman, and Seattle made no mention of Reitman at all. This is
likely because in Reitman itself the Court was focused on the substantive equal
protection problem present in the case—the fact that the state was allegedly
encouraging private racial discrimination. Yet, also present, but not articulated, in
Reitman was the same procedural equal protection problem found in Hunter and
Seattle: racial minorities seeking to enact antidiscrimination laws now faced a
“comparative structural burden” because a constitutional amendment repealed and
prohibited the re-enactment of such laws. Of course, in hindsight, despite Reitman’s

197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

See id. at 461–64.
Id. at 462 (quoting Washington Initiative 350).
See id. at 462–63.
See id. at 471.
Id. at 472.
Id. at 474, 483.
See id. at 474 n.17.
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formal holding, the case could be judicially reconstructed as a case about
comparative structural burdens, which would put it on all fours with Hunter
and Seattle.
Not until the Court’s 1996 decision in Romer v. Evans204 did a majority of the
Court—in an opinion authored by Justice Kennedy—tie the three cases together,
referring to them as “our precedents involving discriminatory restructuring of
governmental decisionmaking.”205 In Romer, the Court addressed the
constitutionality of a Colorado constitutional amendment that repealed state and
local laws prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation and
prohibited the subsequent enactment of such laws at either the state or local
levels.206 Although the lower court relied on the Court’s reordering of the political
process cases, the Romer Court instead held that the law was unconstitutional for a
different reason, namely because it was not rationally related to furthering any
legitimate governmental interest.207 While Romer’s discussion of this line of cases is
limited and unnecessary to the Court’s decision, it did arguably reconstruct Reitman
as being a case about erecting comparative structural burdens for the enactment of
laws benefiting racial minorities.
The Court’s most recent decision in this line of cases—Schuette v. Coalition to
Defend Affirmative Action208—provides a much starker example of
re-characterization. In Schuette, the Court assessed the constitutionality of Proposal
2, a voter-approved amendment to Michigan’s constitution that prohibited
race-conscious preferences in admissions at the state’s public colleges and
universities.209 The Sixth Circuit, sitting en banc, engaged in a seemingly
straightforward application of Hunter and Washington to declare Proposal 2
unconstitutional.210 Just like antidiscrimination laws in Hunter and racially
integrative busing in Seattle, the Sixth Circuit concluded that race-conscious
admissions programs inure primarily to the benefit of the minority.211 Moreover,
just as in those two cases, the Sixth Circuit concluded that Proposal 2 placed a
comparative structural burden on minorities seeking to enact race-conscious
admissions programs since they could no longer seek redress at the university
governing boards as others could for non-race based policies; they would instead
have to first seek voter approval to reverse the constitutional amendment before
getting race-conscious admissions policies enacted.212
Given the Sixth Circuit’s seemingly textbook application of the Court’s
political process doctrine, it appeared that the Court’s options were either to affirm
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Id. at 625.
Id. at 624.
Id. at 625–26, 635.
Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, 572 U.S. 291 (2014).
See id. at 298–99.
See BAMN v. Regents of the Univ. of Mich., 701 F.3d 466, 477 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc).
See id. at 478–79.
See id. at 483–85.
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the lower court—as Justice Sotomayor argued for in dissent213—or to overrule the
entire line of cases—as Justice Scalia argued for in a concurrence.214 Instead, Justice
Kennedy’s plurality opinion proceeded to judicially reconstruct the entire line of
cases in such a remarkable manner that the diametrically opposing opinions of
Justices Sotomayor and Scalia agreed on one point: that the majority had
reinterpreted the precedents “beyond recognition.”215
Justice Kennedy began his reconstruction by subtly shifting his treatment of
Reitman. Just as he did in his opinion in Romer, he identified Reitman as the
“beginning point for discussing the controlling decisions” in this line of cases.216
But unlike Romer, he no longer referred to the cases as precedents involving
discriminatory restructuring of governmental decisionmaking. Instead, Justice
Kennedy described the constitutional infirmity in Reitman as the state
“encourage[ing] discrimination, causing real and specific injury.”217 This was, in fact,
an accurate description of Reitman, and neither Justice Sotomayor nor Justice Scalia
challenged it. However, Justice Kennedy then proceeded to reconstruct Hunter and
Seattle to make it appear as though the constitutional problem in those cases was a
similar substantive one of the government encouraging racial discrimination rather
than the procedural problem of making it harder for racial minorities to enact
legislation in their interest.
Justice Kennedy first turned his attention to Hunter. According to Justice
Kennedy, “[c]entral to the Court’s reasoning in Hunter was that the charter
amendment was enacted in circumstances where widespread racial discrimination
in the sale and rental of housing led to segregated housing, forcing many to live in
“‘unhealthful, unsafe, unsanitary and overcrowded conditions.’”218 He then tied
Hunter back to Reitman, contending that in both cases “there was a demonstrated
injury on the basis of race that, by reasons of state encouragement or participation,
became more aggravated.”219 By tying Hunter and Reitman together in this manner,
Kennedy suggested that they were both about the government encouraging private
discrimination. However, in Hunter, the Court explicitly disclaimed any reliance on
a finding that the City of Akron was encouraging racial discrimination and made
clear that its holding was based on the procedural comparative structural burden:
Akron argues that this case is unlike Reitman v. Mulkey in that here the city
charter declares no right to discriminate in housing, authorizes and
encourages no housing discrimination, and places no ban on the enactment
of fair housing ordinances. But we need not rest on Reitman to decide this
case. Here, unlike Reitman, there was an explicitly racial classification
213. See Schuette, 572 U.S. at 357 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
214. See id. at 322 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
215. See id. at 320–21 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); id. at 360 (Sotomayor,
J., dissenting).
216. Id. at 302 (plurality opinion).
217. Id. at 303.
218. Id.
219. Id. at 304.
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treating racial housing matters differently from other racial and
housing matters.220
By failing to acknowledge this portion of Hunter, Justice Kennedy effectively
re-wrote the opinion.
Having judicially reconstructed Hunter to align it with Reitman’s substantive
equal protection holding, Justice Kennedy proceeded to do the same with Seattle.
According to Justice Kennedy, “Seattle is best understood as a case in which the
state action in question . . . had the serious risk, if not purpose, of causing specific
injuries on account of race, just as had been the case in [Reitman] and Hunter.”221 To
support this remarkable reconstruction of Seattle, Justice Kennedy cited not to the
opinion itself but instead to Justice Breyer’s dissent in Parents Involved in Community
Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1222—a case decided twenty-five years after
Seattle.223 According to Justice Kennedy, Justice Breyer’s Parents Involved dissent
showed that “school segregation in the district in the 1940’s and 1950’s may have
been the partial result of school board policies.”224 Thus, Justice Kennedy reasoned,
the Seattle Court likely viewed the school board’s desegregation program to be an
appropriate remedy for de jure segregation.225 And given that the Seattle Court
thought, or at least assumed, that Seattle had a history of de jure segregation, it
supposedly “found that the State’s disapproval of the school board’s busing remedy
was an aggravation of the very racial injury in which the State itself
was complicit.”226
Having thus constructed an alternative rationale for the Court’s opinion in
Seattle, Justice Kennedy proceeded to treat Seattle’s actual holding as dictum.
Specifically, he wrote:
The broad language used in Seattle, however, went well beyond the analysis
needed to resolve the case . . . . In essence, according to the broad reading
of Seattle, any state action with a “racial focus” that makes it “more difficult
for certain racial minorities than for other groups” to “achieve legislation
that is in their interest” is subject to strict scrutiny. It is this reading of
Seattle that the Court of Appeals found to be controlling here. And that
reading must be rejected.227
Justice Kennedy concluded by providing a new description of the
Reitman-Hunter-Seattle line of cases. According to his opinion, “[t]hose cases were
ones in which the political restriction in question was designed to be used, or was

220. Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 389 (1969).
221. Schuette, 572 U.S. at 305.
222. Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
223. Schuette, 572 U.S. at 305 (citing Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs., 551 U.S. at 807–08 (Breyer,
J., dissenting)).
224. Id.
225. Id. at 306.
226. Id.
227. Id. at 306–07.
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likely to be used, to encourage infliction of injury by reason of race.”228
Justices Scalia and Sotomayor, while disagreeing on how the case should be
resolved, on multiple occasions called out what they viewed as Justice Kennedy’s
egregious re-characterization of Hunter and Seattle. For example, Justice Scalia
described the plurality’s description of the holding in Seattle as “what our opinion
in Seattle might have been, but assuredly not what it was.”229 Similarly, Justice
Sotomayor remarked that “the plurality might prefer that the Seattle Court had said
that, but it plainly did not,”230 and that “[w]e ordinarily understand our precedents
to mean what they actually say, not what we later think they could or should have
said.”231 Indeed, in a passage of her dissent that resonates with the thesis of this
Article, Justice Sotomayor explained how the plurality’s effort at stealth
reconstruction of earlier precedent undermines the principle of stare decisis:
The plurality’s attempt to rewrite Hunter and Seattle so as to cast aside the
political-process doctrine sub silentio is impermissible as a matter of stare
decisis. Under the doctrine of stare decisis, we usually stand by our decisions,
even if we disagree with them, because people rely on what we say, and
they believe they can take us at our word.232
C. Citing “Dissenting Concurrences”
Part I.A of this Article described how Justice Kennedy’s opinion in Lawrence
reconstructed the meaning of an earlier precedent, Lewis, by stripping seemingly
supportive language from its context and quoting that language in a way that gave
it a rather different meaning. Yet Justice Kennedy’s treatment of Lewis was
remarkable for a second reason: he was not even quoting from the majority opinion.
Rather, he was quoting a concurring opinion, one authored by Justice Kennedy
himself and joined by only one other Justice.
Reliance on concurring rather than majority opinions in earlier cases
represents a third method of reconstructing precedent. In some instances, a Justice
in an earlier decision disagrees, sometimes strongly, with one or more aspects of the
Court’s majority opinion. Indeed, the disagreement is sometimes so strong that it
would be most appropriate for the Justice to pen a dissenting opinion. However, by
denominating her opinion as a concurring one, the Justice is able to plant the seeds
for effectively overturning the decision while appearing to follow it in a subsequent
case. In some instances, the latter step is undertaken years or decades later by
another Justice. But in other instances, a dramatic shift in the Court’s composition
allows the same Justice who wrote a dissenting concurrence to effectuate
reconstruction of the earlier decision. While there are many examples of this
phenomenon, two rather significant cases involving substantive due process stand
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

Id. at 313–14.
Id. at 321 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 359 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 358.
Id. at 360.
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out: the Court’s recognition of a right to “liberty of contract” in Lochner v. New
York,233 and the introduction of the “undue burden” standard for assessing the
constitutionality of laws restricting abortion in Planned Parenthood of Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey.234
1. Lochner and “Liberty of Contract”
As noted above, in Lochner, the U.S. Supreme Court endorsed the theory that
the Due Process Clause protected “liberty of contract.”235 This theory led the Court
during the early twentieth century to strike down hundreds of federal and state
laws236 until the line of decisions was ultimately overruled.237 Ironically, this
now-repudiated line of cases came into being through a remarkable process of
judicial reconstruction of the Court’s earlier precedents—which had in clear and
unmistakable terms rejected the Lochner Court’s interpretation of the Due Process
Clause—through the use of a dissenting concurrence penned in a pre-Lochner case.
Shortly after the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment, the U.S. Supreme
Court had its first opportunity in The Slaughter-House Cases238 to interpret many of
its clauses. In Slaughter-House, the Court rejected arguments made by an association
of butchers that a state law that gave a private corporation a monopoly over
livestock landing and slaughterhouse operations in New Orleans violated, inter alia,
the Privileges or Immunities and Due Process Clauses, broadly rejecting the Court’s
authority to recognize and enforce unenumerated rights under either provision.239
In contrast, Justice Bradley’s dissenting opinion contended that both clauses protect
the individual right to pursue common occupations of life and that the law at issue
infringed upon that right.240
Soon after the Court’s decision in Slaughter-House, Louisiana adopted a new
constitution that, among other things, extinguished the monopoly powers over
livestock landing and slaughterhouse operations that were at issue in that case.241
Litigation over the monopoly powers returned to the Court once again, but this
time with the private corporation asserting that the constitutional provision
extinguishing its contractually granted monopoly rights violated the Contracts
Clause242 of the U.S. Constitution.243 Writing for the majority in Butchers’ Union

233. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
234. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
235. See Lochner, 198 U.S. at 45–65.
236. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2617 (2015) (Roberts, J., dissenting).
237. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 400 (1937).
238. The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872).
239. See generally id. at 57–80.
240. See id. at 122–23 (Bradley, J., dissenting).
241. See Butchers’ Union Slaughter-house and Live-stock Landing Co. v. Crescent City
Live-Stock Landing and Slaughter-house Co., 111 U.S. 746, 746–48 (1884).
242. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
243. See Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 749.
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Slaughterhouse Co. v. Crescent City Live-Stock Landing Co.,244 Justice Miller rejected
the Contracts Clause claim.245
Justice Bradley filed a concurring opinion that he acknowledged was for
reasons “different from those stated in the opinion of the court.”246 Rather than
addressing the Contracts Clause claim, Justice Bradley renewed his contention from
his Slaughter-House dissent that the monopoly was void because it interfered with
the right to pursue common occupations of life protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, and indeed cited directly to his dissenting opinion in that
earlier case.247
After Butchers’ Union, the dissenting views in Slaughter-House had now made
their way into a concurring opinion in a subsequent case, giving them an aura of
legal authoritativeness despite the fact that in substance they represented a
dissenting viewpoint. This paved the way for the Court in a series of cases to convert
Justice Bradley’s concurring opinion into binding precedent.
Thirteen years after Butchers’ Union was decided and several years after Justice
Bradley retired, the Court in Allgeyer v. Louisiana248 considered the constitutionality
of a Louisiana law that restricted out-of-state companies from insuring property
within the state. The Allgeyer Court declared the law unconstitutional, concluding
that it deprived the insurers of the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause:
[T]he term [due process] is deemed to embrace the right of the citizen to
be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties, to be free to use them in all
lawful ways, to live and work where he will, to earn his livelihood by any
lawful calling, to pursue any livelihood or avocation, and for that purpose
to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary and essential to
his carrying out to a successful conclusion the purposes
above mentioned.249
In support of this broad proposition—which was at odds with the Court’s
earlier decision in Slaughter-House—the Allgeyer Court cited none other than Justice
Bradley’s concurring opinion in Butchers’ Union.250
As a result of this multi-step process of reconstructing precedent, the
dissenting views in Slaughter-House had made their way into a majority opinion.
Thus, eight years later, when the Court issued its opinion in Lochner, it was able to
briefly and confidently cite the majority opinion in Allgeyer—and solely that
opinion—for the proposition that “[t]he general right to make a contract in relation
to his business is part of the liberty of the individual protected by the 14th

244. Id.
245. See id. at 749–54.
246. See id. at 760 (Bradley, J., concurring).
247. See id. at 761–65.
248. Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897).
249. See id. at 589.
250. See Allgeyer, 165 U.S. at 589 (citing Butchers’ Union, 111 U.S. at 762, 764, 765 (Bradley,
J., concurring)).
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Amendment of the Federal Constitution.”251 From that point onward, the Court
could cite primarily to Lochner for that general proposition. In effect, through the
use of a dissenting concurrence, Justice Bradley’s dissenting views in Slaughter-House
had been laundered through Butchers’ Union, Allgeyer, and Lochner so as to become
controlling constitutional law.
2. Casey and the “Undue Burden” Test
As demonstrated in Part I.B.1, the Court’s decisions recognizing a right to
procure an abortion under the Due Process Clause—including Roe—are premised,
in part, on judicial reconstruction of the Court’s earlier decisions. Be that as it may,
in recognizing the abortion right, Roe clearly and explicitly described the right as
fundamental and subjected restrictions on that right to strict scrutiny review.252 Yet
less than two decades after Roe, a plurality of the Court in Casey—while taking great
pains to make clear that as a matter of stare decisis it would not overturn
Roe—replaced the strict scrutiny standard with a far less exacting “undue
burden” standard.253
Although references in abortion cases to “undue burdens” appeared as early
as Roe itself, the Court did not initially use them as a distinct test for assessing the
constitutionality of abortion restrictions. Instead, those references were merely a
way for Justices to describe the degree to which specific abortion restrictions
burdened the rights of those seeking to procure an abortion. For example, in Roe
and its companion case, Chief Justice Burger wrote a separate concurrence in which
he indicated that he would be inclined to uphold a particular aspect of Texas’s
abortion law because he did not view the required procedure as “unduly
burdensome.”254 A few years later in Bellotti v. Baird,255 the author of Roe wrote an
opinion indicating that a parental consent provision would raise constitutional
concerns only if it “unduly burden[ed]” the minor’s right to procure an abortion.256
References to challenged laws not being constitutional where they do not unduly
burden the abortion right also appeared in two cases challenging laws prohibiting
the funding of abortions, Maher v. Roe257 and Harris v. McRae,258 although in both
cases even that reference was largely irrelevant because the Court made clear that
the Due Process Clause was not even properly implicated in the cases.259
A decade after Roe was decided, the Court in City of Akron v. Akron Center for

251. See Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905) (citing Allgeyer, 165 U.S. 578).
252. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155–56, 162–64 (1973).
253. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833,
874–79 (1992).
254. See Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 208 (1973) (Burger, J., concurring).
255. Bellotti v. Baird, 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
256. See id at 145–48.
257. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 473–74 (1977).
258. Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314 (1980).
259. Id. at 317–18.

First to Printer_Nicolas.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/30/20 4:13 PM

972

[Vol. 10:937

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

Reproductive Health, Inc.260 reiterated that Roe required strict scrutiny of laws
restricting the abortion right and applied that standard to strike down most portions
of a city ordinance restricting abortion.261 This generated a dissent by Justice
O’Connor, who instead contended that the “undue burden” standard was the
appropriate one for assessing restrictions on the abortion right.262 According to
Justice O’Connor, under this standard, the Court was first to determine whether
the law at issue placed an “undue burden” on the abortion right.263 If not, the law
would be sustained so long as it passed rational basis review.264 In support of this
conclusion, she cited Bellotti, Maher, and Harris,265 all of which used the phrase in
the informal way described above and none of which suggested that rational basis
review would apply if the burden was not deemed undue.
The very same day that City of Akron was decided, the Court issued opinions
in two other cases—Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft266
and Simopoulos v. Virginia267—regarding the constitutionality of abortion
restrictions. Unlike City of Akron, which struck down all of the challenged
provisions, in these two cases, the Court upheld some or all of the challenged
statutes.268 Justice O’Connor wrote concurring opinions in these two cases, agreeing
with the result but contending that the undue burden standard applied.269 Justice
O’Connor was thus able to almost immediately include what was in substance a
dissenting view into a pair of dissenting concurrences. In the decade that followed,
Justice O’Connor reiterated in concurring opinions in Hodgson v. Minnesota270 and
Webster v. Reproductive Services271 and in a dissenting opinion in Thornburgh
v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists272 that the undue burden standard
applied when assessing restrictions on abortion.
This series of separate opinions laid the foundation for the Court’s 1992
decision in Casey. There, Justices O’Connor, Kennedy, and Souter penned the
controlling “joint opinion” for the Court, which reaffirmed what it described as

260. City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416 (1983).
261. See id. at 427.
262. See id. at 453, 461–66 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
263. See id. at 453.
264. See id.
265. See id. at 453, 461 n.8.
266. Planned Parenthood Ass’n of Kansas City, Mo., Inc. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476 (1983).
267. Simopoulos v. Virginia, 462 U.S. 506 (1983).
268. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 494; Simopoulos, 462 U.S. at 518–19.
269. See Ashcroft, 462 U.S. at 505 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part in the judgment and
dissenting in part); Simopoulos, 462 U.S. at 519–20 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in
the judgment).
270. Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 459 (1990) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment in part).
271. Webster v. Reprod. Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 529–30 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment).
272. Thornburgh v. Am. Coll. Of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 828–29 (1986)
(O’Connor, J., dissenting).
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“Roe’s essential holding”273 but replaced Roe’s strict scrutiny standard with the
“undue burden” standard.274 In support of its conclusion that the “undue burden”
standard was the appropriate one, the opinion cited Bellotti, Maher, and Harris, as
well as Justice O’Connor’s separate opinions in Hodgson, Webster, Thornburgh, City
of Akron, Ashcroft, and Simopoulos.275 Justice O’Connor was thus able to make it
appear in Casey’s joint opinion as though the undue burden standard was firmly
established even though the cited cases were mostly dissenting concurrences written
by Justice O’Connor herself—often joined by no other Justice—or were majority
opinions that used the phrase in an informal way to describe the degree of burden
on the abortion right in the cases before the Court.
The joint opinion in Casey was criticized by a majority of the Justices, liberal
and conservative alike. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for himself and three other
Justices, described it as “created largely out of whole cloth by the authors of the
joint opinion,” noted that it “does not command the support of a majority of this
Court,” and advocated instead for overruling Roe and applying no more than
rational basis review to laws restricting abortion.276 Justice Blackmun agreed with
this characterization and advocated instead for the application of strict scrutiny.277
Ultimately, the “undue burden” standard was ratified by a majority of the
Court in Stenberg v. Carhart278 with a simple citation of Casey,279 effectively
laundering Justice O’Connor’s dissenting views into a solid majority opinion.
II. JUDICIAL RECONSTRUCTION OF OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
As demonstrated in Part I, the Court has employed a variety of different
methods for reconstructing its precedents interpreting the Reconstruction
Amendments. These same methods can and have been used to reconstruct
precedents addressing other provisions of the U.S. Constitution. Although an
exhaustive examination of every Court decision engaging in judicial reconstruction
of precedent is beyond the scope of this Article, this section provides two examples
of such cases, both of which involve multiple reconstructions of earlier precedent.
A. The Interstate Commerce Clause Cases
One of Congress’s key enumerated powers is its power to regulate interstate
commerce pursuant to the Commerce Clause.280 Indeed, when the Court in The

273. See Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992).
274. See id. at 874.
275. See id. at 874–75.
276. See id. at 964, 966 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting
in part).
277. See id. at 930, 942 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part,
and dissenting in part).
278. Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000).
279. See id. at 921.
280. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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Civil Rights Cases declared that Congress lacked the power under the Thirteenth or
Fourteenth Amendments to enact the Civil Rights Act of 1875, it hinted that such
a law might be upheld if Congress enacted and justified the law on Commerce
Clause grounds.281 Nearly 80 years later, the Court upheld the constitutionality of a
similar federal statute prohibiting racial discrimination in public accommodations
on Commerce Clause grounds.282 However, like the Court’s precedents interpreting
the Reconstruction Amendments, the Court’s precedents governing the Commerce
Clause power have likewise been the subject of extensive judicial reconstruction.
The Court’s early cases interpreting the Commerce Clause power attempted
to strictly demarcate what fell within and outside that power, with the line
sometimes drawn between direct and indirect effects on commerce283 and at other
times between harmful and harmless goods.284 But beginning in 1937, at the same
time that the Court overruled its Lochner-era precedents, it also abandoned these
various tests for assessing the constitutionality of congressional exercises of the
Commerce Clause power and replaced them with one that required only that the
regulated activity “substantially” effect commerce.285 This test was a highly
deferential one, with the Court holding that it would give deference to a
congressional finding that a regulated activity substantially effects interstate
commerce so long as the finding was “rational.”286 Indeed, so deferential was the
Court’s substantial effects test that even a seemingly isolated instance of commerce
that was purely intrastate in character could be regulated by Congress when that
activity—when combined with like conduct by others—effected interstate
commerce.287 As a result, the only activities that were outside the reach of
Congress’s Commerce Clause power were those that were wholly engaged in
intrastate and had no effects at all outside of the state.288
In these cases, the Court clarified that Congress’s Commerce Clause power
could be divided into three different categories:
The Commerce Clause reaches, in the main, three categories of problems.
First, the use of channels of interstate or foreign commerce which
Congress deems are being misused, as, for example, the shipment of stolen
goods . . . or of persons who have been kidnaped . . . . Second, protection
of the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, as, for example, the
destruction of an aircraft . . . or persons or things in commerce, as, for

281. See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 19–20 (1883).
282. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 295 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel,
Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 242–43 (1964).
283. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 546–50 (1935).
284. See Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 271–72 (1918).
285. See Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 120 (1942); United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100,
115–17 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 40–41 (1937).
286. See Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, Inc., 452 U.S. 264, 277 (1981);
Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 303–04.
287. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 (1975).
288. See Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 302.
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example, thefts from interstate shipments . . . . Third, those activities
affecting commerce.289
The first two categories are in some sense the core of the Commerce Clause
power, and in listing these three subjects of regulation, the Court frequently
emphasized that the Commerce Clause power was not limited to the first two but
also included the third.290 Moreover, it is to this third category that the deferential
“substantial effects” test was applied by the Court.
For nearly sixty years, the Court followed this highly deferential test with
respect to the third category and placed few limits on Congress’s Commerce Clause
power. However, in 1995, after the Court’s composition had shifted in a decidedly
conservative direction, the Court issued an opinion in United States v. Lopez291 that
drew a rigid line between what it characterized as “economic” and “non-economic”
activity, with the Commerce Clause power interpreted to encompass only
the former.
At issue in Lopez was the constitutionality of a federal statute that made it a
criminal offense to possess a firearm within a school zone.292 The Court began by
identifying the three categories of activity that Congress can regulate pursuant to
the Commerce Clause.293 Finding the first two categories inapplicable to the statute
at issue, the Lopez Court turned its focus to the third category.294 It began by noting
that its case law to date had not been entirely clear on what constitutes a substantial
effect on interstate commerce.295 However, the Court reviewed its cases upholding
Congress’s exercise of Commerce Clause power based on substantial effects and
concluded that all of them contained a common ingredient that the Court referred
to alternatively as “economic” or “commercial” activity.296 It listed as examples its
decisions upholding laws regulating coal mining; extortionate credit transactions;
restaurants using substantial interstate supplies; inns and hotels catering to interstate
guests; and production and consumption of homegrown wheat.297 The Court
contrasted these with the law at issue—regulating the possession of a gun—which
the Court concluded did not constitute economic or commercial activity.298 The
Court also noted that in addition to not regulating commercial activity, the law was
not “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were

289. Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 150 (1971); accord F.E.R.C. v. Mississippi, 456
U.S. 742, 754 n.18 (1982); Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276–77.
290. See F.E.R.C., 456 U.S. at 754 n.18; Hodel, 452 U.S. at 276–77.
291. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
292. See id. at 551–52.
293. See id. at 558–59.
294. See id. at 559.
295. See id.
296. See id. at 559–61.
297. See id. at 559–60.
298. See id. at 560–61.

First to Printer_Nicolas.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/30/20 4:13 PM

976

[Vol. 10:937

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

regulated.”299 The Court thus held that the law could not be upheld under its
decisions “upholding regulations of activities that arise out of or are connected with
a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially affects
interstate commerce.”300
While the line that the Lopez Court sought to draw between commercial and
non-commercial activity was a plausible way to distinguish Lopez from the Court’s
earlier decision, the nature of the regulated activity was never a relevant
consideration in the Court’s earlier decisions.301 In fact, those decisions had
expressly stated that the plenary nature of Congress’s commerce power gave
Congress the ability to regulate any type of activity so long as it substantially effected
commerce.302 Thus, the Lopez Court—which made clear in its decision that it felt
the need to constrain the scope of Congress’s Commerce Clause
power303—reconstructed its precedents in order to achieve its desired outcome.
Five years later, the Court once again invoked the distinction between
economic and non-economic activity as a basis for striking down a federal statute
grounded in the Commerce Clause power. In United States v. Morrison,304 the Court
addressed the constitutionality of a federal statute that provided a civil remedy for
the victims of gender-motivated violence. The Court reasoned that, just like the
possession of guns near schools, “[g]ender-motivated crimes of violence are not, in
any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”305 The Court cited Lopez for the
proposition that its decisions to date have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of
intrastate activity only when that activity is economic in nature.306
Not only did the Lopez and Morrison Courts create a new distinction between
economic and non-economic activity, but they also appeared to make arbitrary
distinctions as to whether given activities counted as economic or non-economic.
For example, it was unclear why possessing a gun near a school was not considered
economic activity. Possession of a gun, after all, seems no less economic than the
regulated activity of racial discrimination307 at issue in cases such as Heart of Atlanta
Motel, Inc. v. United States308 or Katzenbach v. McClung.309 Perhaps the Court’s focus
instead was on where the activity was occurring; thus, non-economic activity could
be regulated if it occurred at an economic establishment.310 But if that is so, it is not
299. See id. at 561.
300. See id.
301. See id. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
302. See Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111,
124–25 (1942); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
303. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 564–68.
304. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
305. See id. at 613.
306. See id. (citing Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559–60).
307. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
308. Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
309. Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
310. See Morrison, 529 U.S. at 656–58 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Lopez, 514 U.S. at 625–27 (Breyer,
J., dissenting).
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clear why a school is any less economic than the hotels and restaurants at issue in
Heart of Atlanta or Katzenbach.311
Indeed, because the line between economic and non-economic activity was
non-existent prior to Lopez and Morrison and ill-defined in those cases, shifting
majorities have been able to and likely in the future will further pivot this line of
cases in one direction or the other by simply asserting that the regulated activity is
or is not economic in nature. Thus, for example, in Gonzales v. Raich,312 the Court
upheld a federal statute criminalizing the local cultivation and use of marijuana,
deeming the targeted activity to be “quintessentially economic,”313 while the dissent
viewed it as non-economic in nature.314
B. The Presidential Removal Power Cases
Article II of the U.S. Constitution provides in general terms that “[t]he
executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.”315
It provides the President with the power to appoint executive officers, but requires
that such appointments receive the “advice and consent” of the U.S. Senate.316
Furthermore, it empowers Congress to provide a different procedure for “inferior
officers,” allowing it to vest the appointment power “as they think proper, in the
President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.”317 Finally,
Article II provides that executive officers can be impeached by Congress for
committing high crimes or misdemeanors.318 However, what Article II is silent on
is the procedure for removing executive officers in the absence of an impeachable
offense. Is this power vested in the President alone, or is the officer’s removal, like
her appointment, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate or some other sort
of check by Congress?
In Myers v. United States,319 the Court engaged in an exhaustive historical
analysis of these various provisions of Article II and issued a sweeping opinion
holding that—save for the proviso for inferior officers—the power to remove
executive officers is committed solely to the President. Myers involved an act that
prevented the President from removing a postmaster without the advice and
consent of the Senate.320 Despite this limit on his authority, Woodrow Wilson
removed Frank S. Myers from his position as postmaster without obtaining the
Senate’s consent.321 Myers brought suit, challenging his removal and demanding the

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.

See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 628–29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
See id. at 25.
See id. at 49–50 (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
See id.
See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52 (1926).
See id. at 107.
See id. at 106.
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pay he would have received had he completed his four-year term.322 The
government argued in response that the act’s limit on the President’s removal
authority was unconstitutional.323
After exhaustively surveying the history behind the enactment of Article II,
the Myers Court identified three, sweeping principles regarding the President’s
removal power: Article II’s vesting of “[t]he executive power” in the President
coupled with the grant of power to appoint executive officers gives him the implied
power to remove such executive officers;324 the Constitution’s only textual limit on
the President’s removal authority is Congress’s power to vest the appointment of
inferior officers in the courts or heads of departments, which simultaneously gives
Congress the ability to vest the power to remove inferior officers in those same
entities;325 and in all other instances, the President possesses an “unrestricted”
removal power.326
Applying these principles, the Court held that the act’s limit on the President’s
ability to remove postmasters violated Article II.327 Furthermore, although not
necessary to the decision, the Myers Court emphasized that its sweeping conclusions
applied regardless of the nature of the removed officer’s functions. It provided as
an example an executive officer who exercises quasi-judicial functions.328
Less than a decade after the Myers decision, the question of presidential
authority to remove executive officers returned once again to the U.S. Supreme
Court. In Humphrey’s Executor v. United States329 the Court reviewed President
Roosevelt’s decision to remove one of his predecessor’s appointees from the
Federal Trade Commission (FTC).330 The executor of the appointee’s estate
brought a suit seeking to collect his unpaid salary, contending that a congressional
act prevented the President from removing members of the FTC except for specific
articulated causes.331
Given Myers’ sweeping language, it would seem to follow logically that the
Court in Humphrey’s Executor would uphold the President’s removal of the FTC
appointee. Yet despite the Myer Court’s conclusion that the President’s removal
power was “unrestricted,” the Humphrey’s Executor Court unanimously upheld the
congressionally imposed limitation on the President’s power to remove members
of the FTC. Dismissing much of Myers as dicta, the Humphrey’s Executor Court
distinguished between executive officers who exercise “purely” executive powers
and those who exercise quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial power, limiting Myers to
322.
323.
324.
325.
326.
327.
328.
329.
330.
331.

Id.
See id. at 108.
See id. at 115–19, 122, 126–27.
See id. at 126–29.
See id. at 130, 162, 172, 176.
Id. at 176.
See id. at 134–35.
Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602 (1935).
See id. at 618–19.
See id.
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only the former.332 Reasoning that the powers exercised by the FTC are partly
quasi-legislative and partly quasi-judicial, the Court upheld Congress’s authority to
limit the President’s ability to remove its members.333
It is hard to discern whether Humphrey’s Executor overruled Myers,
reconstructed it, or both. On the one hand, Humphrey’s Executor noted that Myers
contained statements that tend to support the President’s position but indicated that
such expressions were “disapproved” to the extent inconsistent with the opinion in
Humphrey’s Executor.334 On the other hand, the decision did not purport to overrule
Myers but only to ignore its dicta.335 But by introducing a new theory at odds with
the reasoning in Myers, it appears as though Humphrey’s Executor viewed virtually
everything in Myers as dicta save for its ultimate conclusion. The Humphrey’s
Executor Court characterized that conclusion as “the narrow point actually decided”
therein, namely, “that the President had power to remove a postmaster of the first
class, without the advice and consent of the Senate as required by act of
Congress.”336 In any event, whether Humphrey’s Executor reconstructed or overruled
Myers, it is clear that the Court has sought in subsequent cases to reconstruct this
entire line of precedent on more than one occasion.
The next major case to address the President’s removal power was Wiener
v. United States.337 At issue in Wiener was the President’s authority to remove a
member of the War Claims Commission (WCC). While the Act of Congress creating
the WCC gave the President the power to appoint its members with the advice and
consent of the Senate and provided for a finite date when the WCC would be
disbanded, it did not contain a provision for removing commissioners.338 After
President Truman removed a commissioner, the commissioner filed suit seeking
back pay for the remainder of the time he would have served on the WCC.339
In resolving the dispute, Wiener embraced Humphrey’s Executor’s distinction
between “purely executive officers” and those that exercised quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial powers. While acknowledging that Myers contained language
indicating that the President had the power to remove executive officials who
exercised quasi-judicial powers, the Wiener Court held that Humphrey’s Executor had
modified this aspect of Myers.340 Because the Wiener Court concluded that the
functions of the WCC were quasi-judicial in nature, it held that the President lacked
the inherent constitutional authority to remove its commissioners.341

332.
333.
334.
335.
336.
337.
338.
339.
340.
341.

See id. at 627–28.
See id. at 628.
See id. at 626.
See id. at 626–27.
Id. at 626.
Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349 (1958).
See id. at 349–50.
See id. at 349–51.
See id. at 352 (citing Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 628).
See id. at 353–56.
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Nearly three decades later, in Bowsher v. Synar,342 the Court once again revisited
this line of cases. In Bowsher, the Court addressed the constitutionality of an act of
Congress that attempted to assign executive powers to the Comptroller General, an
official who was appointed by the President but could be removed only by an act
of Congress.343 Relying on Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, and Wiener, the Bowsher
Court declared this statutory scheme unconstitutional.
While purporting to rely on past precedent, Bowsher subtly shifted that
precedent by re-characterizing those cases as being concerned with congressional
participation in the removal of an executive officer. Bowsher first wrote that Myers
declared the statute at issue in that case unconstitutional on the ground that for
Congress to “draw to itself, or to either branch of it, the power to remove or the
right to participate in the exercise of that power . . . would be . . . to infringe the
constitutional principle of the separation of governmental powers.”344 Next, it made
brief mention of Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener, noting that the former
“distinguished Myers, reaffirming its holding that congressional participation in the
removal of executive officers is unconstitutional,” and observing that the latter
“reached a similar result.”345 The Court then summarized the line of cases as
standing for the proposition that “Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of
removal of an officer charged with the execution of the laws except
by impeachment.”346
Bowsher was followed two years later by Morrison v. Olson,347 which relied on
the particular language used in Bowsher to further reconstruct this line of cases. In
Morrison, the Court addressed the constitutionality of a federal statute that vested in
a special division of Article III judges the power to appoint independent counsel
and limited the Attorney General’s ability to remove such counsel, allowing removal
only for conditions, such as physical or mental incapacity, that impair the counsel’s
ability to carry out her duties.348
The Morrison majority first concluded that the independent counsel was not a
principal but rather an “inferior officer.”349 As Justice Scalia noted in dissent, the
majority could have stopped at that finding and held that this fact alone gave
Congress the power to restrict the removal of such an officer by the executive.350
However, Morrison went further, providing a broad reconstruction of its decisions
in Myers, Humphrey’s Executor, Wiener, and Bowsher that replaced the line drawn
between “purely executive officers” and those that exercised quasi-legislative or
quasi-judicial powers with a completely different test for assessing restrictions on
342.
343.
344.
345.
346.
347.
348.
349.
350.

Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714 (1986).
See id. at 717–21.
See id. at 724 (quoting Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 161 (1926)).
Id. at 724–25.
Id. at 726.
Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
See id. at 661, 663.
See id. at 670–73.
See id. at 724 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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the President’s removal power.
As an initial matter, the majority declared the decisions in Myers and Bowsher
wholly inapplicable to the case before the Court. Seizing on both the language in
Bowsher that “Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer
charged with the execution of the laws except by impeachment” and the language
in Myers—as quoted in Bowsher—indicating that the Constitution prevents Congress
from “draw[ing] to itself . . . the power to remove” executive officers, the Court
noted that those precedents did not apply because here, unlike in those cases,
Congress did not give itself the power to remove; it merely restricted the President’s
flexibility to exercise the removal power.351
Turning to Humphrey’s Executor and Wiener, the Morrison Court—while
acknowledging that it “undoubtedly did rely on the terms ‘quasi-legislative’ and
‘quasi-judicial’ to distinguish the officials involved in Humphrey’s Executor and
Wiener from those in Myers”—diminished the importance of that language.352 The
Morrison Court then re-characterized the Court’s removal cases as follows:
The analysis contained in our removal cases is designed not to define rigid
categories of those officials who may or may not be removed at will by the
President, but to ensure that Congress does not interfere with the
President’s exercise of the “executive power” and his constitutionally
appointed duty to “take care that the laws be faithfully executed” under
Article II.353
The Morrison Court stated that “the real question is whether the removal
restrictions are of such a nature that they impede the President’s ability to perform
his constitutional duty, and the functions of the officials in question must be
analyzed in that light.”354 It then identified a number of factors that led the Court
to conclude that the removal restrictions were constitutional, including the fact that
the independent counsel was an inferior officer; that it had a limited jurisdiction and
tenure; that it lacked policymaking or significant administrative authority; and that
the executive retained the authority under the statutory scheme to ensure that the
independent counsel was competently performing his abilities.355
Justice Scalia penned a dissent in Morrison that both chastised the majority for
reconstructing the Court’s precedents and also made note of the Court’s earlier
reconstructions of this line of cases:
Today, however, Humphrey’s Executor is swept into the dustbin of
repudiated constitutional principles . . . . One can hardly grieve for the
shoddy treatment given today to Humphrey’s Executor, which, after all,
accorded the same indignity (with much less justification) to Chief Justice
Taft’s opinion 10 years earlier in Myers v. United States . . . . It is in fact
351.
352.
353.
354.
355.

See id. at 685–86 (majority opinion) (quoting Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 726 (1986)).
See id. at 689.
See id. at 689–90.
Id. at 691.
See id. at 691–93.
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comforting to witness the reality that he who lives by the ipse dixit dies by
the ipse dixit. But one must grieve for the Constitution.356
The most recent case in this line of cases—Free Enterprise Fund
v. PCAOB357—represents yet another reconstruction that retreats from the more
fluid interpretation endorsed by the Morrison Court. Free Enterprise Fund addressed
the constitutionality of what is known as a dual for-cause structure for removing
members of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB).358 Under
the statute creating the Board, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
appoints five members to PCAOB who serve staggered, 5-year terms.359 Congress
provided that members of the SEC could remove members of PCAOB only for
good cause.360 In turn, members of the SEC pursuant to statute could likewise not
be removed except for limited reasons.361
The Free Enterprise Fund Court issued a bright-line opinion holding that such
a dual for-cause structure violates Article II’s vesting of executive power in the
President.362 Citing to the broader principles in Myers,363 the majority reasoned that
this structure prevented the President from holding PCAOB accountable since he
could neither directly remove members nor was there anyone directly responsible
to the President who possessed that power.364
In contrast, the Free Enterprise Fund dissent contended that the majority had
ignored the test set forth in Morrison. First, the dissent described most of the Court’s
decision in Myers—which the majority had relied upon—as having been “expressly
disapproved” of in Humphrey’s Executor.365 Next, it cited Morrison for the
proposition that the “essence” of Myers was that Congress could not aggrandize its
power, a feature not present in the statute at issue.366 Third, it cited Morrison for the
proposition that in lieu of bright line rules and categories, a fact-specific inquiry that
looked at the impact of the law on the President’s exercise of executive power
was required.367
In sum, the Court’s removal power cases have shifted over the last century
between bright-line rules and flexible standards and between broad and narrow
protection of the President’s power to remove executive officials. Yet these
dramatic shifts have occurred without the Court ever expressly overruling its earlier
precedents, with the Justices in the shifting majorities instead opting to
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Id. at 725–26 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
Free Enter. Fund v. PCAOB, 561 U.S. 477 (2010).
See id. at 492.
See id. at 484.
See id. at 486–87.
See id. at 487.
See id. at 496.
See id. at 492–93 (citing Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 164 (1926)).
See id. at 496–98.
See id. at 518 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
See id. (citing Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 686 (1988)).
See id. at 519–23 (citing Olson, 487 U.S. at 689–91).
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re-characterize the Court’s earlier decisions.
III. PRECEDENTS VULNERABLE TO RECONSTRUCTION
As demonstrated above, the Court has demonstrated ingenuity in
reconstructing its precedents interpreting not only the Reconstruction Amendments
but also other constitutional provisions, allowing the Court to maintain formal
fidelity to precedent while in practice subtly overruling it. If the Court continues to
engage in this process, there are several lines of precedent that are ripe for such
reconstruction if the Court’s composition moves more solidly in either a
conservative or liberal direction. Two lines of precedents—the “gay rights” cases
and the cases involving congressional power to “enforce” the Reconstruction
Amendments—provide clear examples of the ways in which a future Court could
reconstruct precedent.
A. The “Gay Rights” Cases
Between 1996 and 2017, the U.S. Supreme Court has issued five opinions
vindicating the Fourteenth Amendment rights of gay persons. First, in 1996, the
Court in Romer v. Evans368 declared unconstitutional an amendment to Colorado’s
constitution that repealed state and local laws prohibiting discrimination on the
basis of sexual orientation and prohibited the subsequent enactment of such laws
at either the state or local levels. Next, in 2003, the Court in Lawrence v. Texas369
struck down a Texas law criminalizing consensual same-sex sodomy. In 2013, the
Court in U.S. v. Windsor370 declared unconstitutional a federal statute barring federal
recognition of same-sex marriages lawfully entered into pursuant to state law. Then
in 2015, the Court in Obergefell v. Hodges371 invalidated state laws prohibiting and
refusing to recognize same-sex marriages. Finally, in 2017, the Court in Pavan
v. Smith372 declared unconstitutional an Arkansas statutory scheme that
automatically put a married woman’s husband’s name on the birth certificate if the
woman gave birth to a child during their marriage but that would not put a married
woman’s wife’s name on the birth certificate in that same circumstance.
These five cases contain a number of elements in common with the cases
examined in Parts I and II of this Article that make them vulnerable to various
forms of reconstruction, both expansive and contractive. As a group, these cases
are ambiguous on the level of scrutiny being applied and at times even the ground
for the decision. Moreover, they were all decided by narrow 5-4 or 6-3 majorities,
suggesting that modest shifts in the Court’s composition in one direction or the
other may make them vulnerable to judicial reconstruction.

368.
369.
370.
371.
372.

Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003).
United States v. Windsor, 570 U.S. 744 (2013).
Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584 (2015).
Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075 (2017).
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In Romer, the Court invoked the Equal Protection Clause to strike down
Colorado’s constitutional amendment but was somewhat ambiguous on the level of
scrutiny that it applied. In terms, the Romer Court purported to apply mere rational
basis review.373 But given how deferential that standard traditionally is,374 it seemed
as though the Court in fact applied a more rigorous level of scrutiny, as some
Justices acknowledged in separate opinions in both Romer itself and in subsequent
cases.375 The Romer dissent seized on the majority’s language in an effort to cabin
the future reach of the decision, dropping a footnote indicating that “[t]he Court
evidently agrees that ‘rational basis’ . . . is the governing standard.”376
In Lawrence, the Court’s opinion was ambiguous on both the basis for the
decision and the level of scrutiny that it applied. With respect to the basis for the
decision, the majority acknowledged the Equal Protection Clause as a viable ground
for invalidating the sodomy statute but opted instead to rely on the Due Process
Clause.377 However, the majority acknowledged a connection between the two
clauses, declaring that “[e]quality of treatment and the due process right to demand
respect for conduct protected by the substantive guarantee of liberty are linked in
important respects.”378 In addition, the Lawrence majority, while heavily relying on
its fundamental rights cases379—suggesting that strict scrutiny or some other
searching form of scrutiny was applicable—used the language of rational basis
review, noting that the law at issue “furthers no legitimate state interest.”380 Just as
in Romer, despite the language used by the Court, its actions suggested that
something more searching than traditional rational basis review was in play.
Moreover, just as in Romer, the dissent seized on this ambiguity in the Court’s
opinion to cabin its reach, noting that the Court nowhere referred to sodomy as a
fundamental right, nor did it claim to apply strict scrutiny but instead purported to
apply only rational basis review.381 Justice O’Connor wrote a separate concurrence
in Lawrence, declining to join its due process holding but instead declaring the law
unconstitutional on equal protection grounds.382 According to Justice O’Connor,
Romer had applied a “more searching form of rational basis review,” which she
deemed likewise applicable in Lawrence.383 Thus, collectively the Lawrence majority
and concurring opinions contained ambiguities on both the constitutional basis for
striking down the law as well as the level of scrutiny.
373. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 632–36.
374. See, e.g., FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 320 (1993); Williamson v. Lee Optical
of Okla., Inc., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955).
375. See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 580 (2003) (O’Connor, J., concurring in the
judgment); Romer, 517 U.S. at 640–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
376. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 640 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
377. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 574–75.
378. See id. at 575.
379. See id. at 564–66, 573–74.
380. See id. at 578.
381. See id. at 594 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
382. See id. at 579 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
383. See id. at 579–80.
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The next two cases, Windsor and Obergefell, together declared unconstitutional
both federal and state laws denying recognition of and entry into same-sex
marriages.384 Pavan then declared unconstitutional a state law that treated
opposite-sex and same-sex couples differently so far as parentage rights tied to
marriage are concerned.385 Like Romer and Lawrence, these cases are ambiguous on
whether the basis for the decision is grounded in equal protection or due process,
as well as the level of scrutiny being applied. Windsor cites both Romer and Lawrence
and vacillates between discussing infringements on liberty and equal protection
principles.386 And although the decision appears to apply something more rigorous
than traditional rational basis scrutiny,387 it uses the language of rational basis in its
analysis.388 In Obergefell, the Court explicitly cited both to due process389 and equal
protection390 principles and cases, although there was some uncertainty as to
whether its equal protection concerns were class-based (sexual orientation) or
rights-based (marriage). Moreover, although the Court cited some of its
fundamental rights cases, suggesting that strict scrutiny or some other form of
heightened level of scrutiny was applicable,391 and the Court appeared to apply
something more rigorous than traditional rational basis review,392 the Court never
articulated a standard of review. Finally, Pavan was a short opinion that simply
extended Obergefell, without discussing whether equal protection or due process
principles were at play and without articulating a standard of review.
Moving forward, this line of cases could easily be reconstructed in dramatically
different ways. A liberal Court majority might re-characterize this entire line of cases
as having applied intermediate or strict scrutiny to laws that discriminate on the
basis of sexual orientation, in the same way that the Court previously
re-characterized its sex and legitimacy lines of cases. Because nearly all of these cases
referenced the Equal Protection Clause, the Court could treat the entire line of cases
as sounding in equal protection. Moreover, because there were plausible rational
bases for the challenged laws in each of these cases, often suggested by the dissents,
the Court could cite those plausible rational bases as evidence that the Court had in
fact been applying a higher level of scrutiny.
If instead, as seems more likely in the near term, the Court were to turn in a
more decisively conservative direction, it would be rather easy for a conservative
majority to cabin the reach of these decisions so far as the rights of sexual minorities
are concerned. The Court could cite the references to the lack of a “legitimate”
384. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2597–602 (2015); United States v. Windsor,
570 U.S. 744, 775 (2013).
385. See Pavan v. Smith, 137 S. Ct. 2075, 2078–79 (2017).
386. See Windsor, 570 U.S. at 768–75.
387. See id. at 793–94 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
388. See id. at 775 (noting that no “legitimate purpose” justifies the federal statute).
389. See Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. at 2597–602.
390. See id. at 2602–05.
391. See id. at 2597–602.
392. See id. at 2623 (Roberts, J., dissenting).

First to Printer_Nicolas.docx (Do Not Delete)

3/30/20 4:13 PM

986

[Vol. 10:937

UC IRVINE LAW REVIEW

governmental interest in support of a conclusion that only rational basis review
applies to sexual orientation classifications. Moreover, the Court could cabin the
reach of Lawrence, Windsor, Obergefell, and Pavan by treating those cases as focused
on the specific rights involved and not about classifications based on
sexual orientation.
In sum, because this line of cases is controversial and because the decisions
contain ambiguous language regarding both the constitutional grounds at issue and
the level of scrutiny applicable, they are ripe for judicial reconstruction should the
Court’s composition shift decisively in one direction or the other.
B. The Enforcement Power Cases
Since the enactment of the Reconstruction Amendments, the Court has been
sharply divided on the authority each of those amendments grants Congress to
“enforce” them.393 Cases interpreting Congress’s authority under these enforcement
provisions have not only been the subject of multiple judicial reconstructions over
the past 150 years but are vulnerable to further reconstruction by the Court, because
of various ambiguities contained therein.
The Court’s earliest decisions suggested that these enforcement provisions
gave Congress no authority to proscribe conduct beyond that which the
self-executing parts of these amendments already prohibited. Thus, for example, in
The Civil Rights Cases,394 the U.S. Supreme Court rejected arguments that Congress
possessed the power under either Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment or
Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment to enact Sections 1 and 2 of the Civil Rights
Act of 1875, which prohibited discrimination on the basis of race by places of public
accommodation. With respect to Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
Court indicated that Congress’s power did not extend beyond the scope of the
self-executing provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.395 Because those
self-executing provisions apply only when state action is involved, congressional
acts enacted pursuant to Section 5 likewise could target only state, not private
action.396 As for Section 2 of the Thirteenth Amendment, the Court assumed for
the sake of argument that it empowered Congress to enact legislation targeting the
so-called “badges and incidents of slavery,” but concluded that even if such a power
existed, the denial of admission to public accommodations did not constitute a
“badge” or “incident” of slavery, engaging in its own analysis of the meaning of
those terms without any deference to Congress.397
As indicated in Part I.A.2 of this Article, the U.S. Supreme Court in Jones
v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.398 engaged in judicial reconstruction of its earlier decision in
393.
394.
395.
396.
397.
398.

See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII, § 2; U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5; U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 2.
The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3, 11–19, 20–25 (1883).
See id. at 11.
See id. at 11–19.
See id. at 20–25.
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 439 (1968).

First to Printer_Nicolas.docx (Do Not Delete)

2020]

RECONSTRUCTION

3/30/20 4:13 PM

987

The Civil Rights Cases399 to conclude that Congress has sweeping powers to
“enforce” the Thirteenth Amendment to eradicate the “badges or incidents” of
slavery, with deference given to a congressional determination that something
constitutes a badge or incident of slavery. The same liberal Court that decided Jones
issued decisions in two other cases—South Carolina v. Katzenbach400 and Katzenbach
v. Morgan401—that construed Congress’s powers under Section 2 of the Fifteenth
Amendment and Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, respectively, to be
similarly sweeping in scope. South Carolina echoed the Jones Court’s deferential
language in describing Congress’s power under the Fifteenth Amendment,402 while
Morgan appeared to go further, suggesting that Congress even had the power to
decide that conduct violated the Fourteenth Amendment and to legislate
accordingly to prohibit that conduct.403
Nearly thirty years later, after the Court moved in a decidedly more
conservative direction, it revisited the question of congressional power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment. At issue in City of Boerne v. Flores404 was
the constitutionality of a federal statute that purported to “enforce” the First
Amendment guarantee to the free exercise of religion—incorporated and applied to
the states via the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment—pursuant to
Congress’s Section 5 powers.405 The statute prohibited all levels of government
from enacting laws that substantially burdened the free exercise of religion unless
the laws were found to further a compelling governmental interest.406 Congress had
passed the statute in response to a U.S. Supreme Court decision holding that neutral,
generally applicable laws are not subject to such a compelling governmental interest
test even if they have the effect of burdening the free exercise of religion.407
In City of Boerne, the Court made clear that Congress lacked the power under
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to define what constitutes a violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment: “Legislation which alters the meaning of the Free Exercise
Clause cannot be said to be enforcing the Clause. Congress does not enforce a
constitutional right by changing what the right is. It has been given the power ‘to
enforce,’ not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional violation.”408
The City of Boerne Court acknowledged that there was language in Morgan that could
be construed as giving Congress such a power but indicated that “[t]his is not a
necessary interpretation, however, or even the best one.”409 It then proceeded to
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109 U.S. at 20–21 (1883).
South Carolina v. Katzenbach, 383 U.S. 301, 326–27 (1966).
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 648–51 (1966).
See Katzenbach, 383 U.S. at 326–27.
See Katzenbach, 384 U.S. at 648–51 (1966).
City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 516 (1997).
See id. at 516.
See id. at 515–16.
See id. at 512–14.
See id. at 519.
See id. at 527–28.
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reconstruct its earlier decision in Morgan by focusing on what the Court did, rather
than what it wrote.
Ultimately, City of Boerne did not swing the pendulum back to the extreme of
The Civil Rights Cases. Instead, it acknowledged that Congress had remedial powers
under Section 5 to prohibit a broader swath of conduct than that which is strictly
forbidden by the self-executing portions of the Fourteenth Amendment, so long as
there is “congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or
remedied and the means adopted to that end.”410 As an example of a statute that
satisfied the newly minted congruence and proportionality test, the City of Boerne
Court cited the South Carolina Court’s analysis of the Voting Rights Act of 1965.411
The City of Boerne test was definitely more restrictive than the Morgan test.
Thus, although some federal statutes enacted pursuant to Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment were upheld post-City of Boerne,412 many were declared
unconstitutional.413 Given that the Court’s decisions granting Congress broad
power to “enforce” the Thirteenth and Fifteenth Amendments were decided by the
same liberal Court that in Morgan acknowledged sweeping congressional power to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, it seemed plausible in the wake of City of
Boerne that those precedents were likewise subject to being overruled, or at
least reconstructed.
In Northwest Austin v. Holder,414 the question arose whether City of Boerne’s
congruence and proportionality test likewise applied to provisions of the Voting
Rights Act of 1965 enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment that
had previously been upheld in South Carolina. However, the Court avoided deciding
the issue by resolving the challenge on narrower statutory interpretation grounds.415
Writing separately, Justice Thomas invoked the Court’s post-City of Boerne
precedents involving Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to conclude that the
statute at issue was unconstitutional.416
Four years later, in Shelby County v. Holder,417 the Court once again revisited
the constitutionality of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, but this time declared
portions of the Act previously upheld in South Carolina unconstitutional. Shelby
County, however, was unclear on whether the Act was unconstitutional because it
failed the deferential rationality test espoused in South Carolina or if instead because
it was subject to and failed the congruence and proportionality test of City of Boerne.

410. See id. at 519–20; see also Kimel v. Fla. Bd. of Regents, 528 U.S. 62, 81 (2000).
411. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 530–33.
412. See, e.g., Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509 (2004); Nev. Dep’t of Human Res. v. Hibbs, 538
U.S. 721 (2003).
413. See, e.g., Bd. of Trs. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); United States
v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000); Kimel, 528 U.S. at 67.
414. Nw. Austin v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 204 (2009).
415. See id. at 204.
416. See id. at 225–26 (Thomas, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part).
417. Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 556–57 (2013).
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On the one hand, the Court used the rationality language of South Carolina,418 which
the dissent seized on to contend that the test had not changed.419 On the other
hand, the dissent persuasively argued that what the majority required was more than
the rationality test of South Carolina demanded.420
The ambiguities in Shelby County have raised two related questions that lower
federal courts and commentators are currently grappling with. First, did Shelby
County adopt the congruence and proportionality test of City of Boerne for assessing
laws enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the Fifteenth Amendment?421 And second, if
so, does that same test apply to legislation enacted pursuant to Section 2 of the
Thirteenth Amendment, resulting in a modification of the rationality test espoused
in Jones?422
Post-Shelby County, the three lines of cases addressing congressional power to
enforce the Reconstruction Amendments are vulnerable to contractive
reconstruction. A more decisively conservative Court can reconstruct this entire set
of cases to conclude that congressional acts purporting to enforce any of the three
Reconstruction Amendments must be subjected to the congruence and
proportionality test. In so concluding, the Court can focus on what the Court in
Shelby County did rather than what it said, relying on the dissent’s arguments that
the law at issue satisfied rationality review, thus supporting the conclusion that the
Court implicitly endorsed a more rigorous test. Moreover, the Court could point to
City of Boerne’s citation of South Carolina as an example of a situation that passed
muster under the congruence and proportionality test as further proof that despite
the rationality language used in South Carolina, it in fact applied something more
rigorous. This would be analogous to what the Court did in its cases ramping up
scrutiny for sex-based classifications, where it focused on what the earlier cases in
fact did rather than their language to conclude that something more rigorous than
rational basis review was applied.
CONCLUSION
As this Article has demonstrated, in assessing the actual or likely respect for
precedent of former, sitting, or prospective U.S. Supreme Court Justices, it is not
enough to focus on the formal doctrine of stare decisis and their fidelity to it. At few
points in our constitutional history has the Court formally overturned precedent,
yet the underlying doctrine has nonetheless shifted dramatically over time through
the process of judicially reconstructing precedent.

418. See id. at 556.
419. See id. at 568–69 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
420. See id. at 569–70.
421. See, e.g., Calvin Massey, The Effect of Shelby County on Enforcement of the Reconstruction
Amendments, 29 J.L. & POL. 397, 413 (2014); Jason Mazzone & Stephen Rushin, From Selma to
Ferguson: The Voting Rights Act As a Blueprint for Police Reform, 105 CAL. L. REV. 263, 328–29 (2017).
422. See United States v. Metcalf, 881 F.3d 641, 645 (8th Cir. 2018); United States v. Cannon,
750 F.3d 492, 502–05 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Hatch, 722 F.3d 1193, 1203–05 (10th Cir. 2013).
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Accordingly, if one is serious about fidelity to precedent, the focus of any such
inquiry must shift away from questions about formal fidelity to stare decisis and the
nominees must instead be asked their opinions about the process of judicial
reconstruction. Such a shift will serve several salutary purposes. First, within the
context of confirmation hearings of prospective U.S. Supreme Court Justices,
asking nominees nuanced questions about their views on judicial reconstruction will
better allow Senators and the public to assess the nominee’s likely impact on the
future trajectory of constitutional law. Second, once the process of judicial
reconstruction is brought to light and treated on par with overturning precedent,
the incentive for sitting Justices to engage in judicial reconstruction will disappear.
This will force Justices bent on changing doctrine to be transparent about what they
are doing and why they are doing it, since it will no longer be possible to hide being
a veil of formal fidelity to precedent. The end result may be somewhat more
instances in which doctrine is formally overturned but overall greater fidelity to
precedent, coupled with transparent explanations in those instances in which the
Court opts to overturn precedent. Although the Court’s current approach provides
a façade of stability, the approach advocated for in this Article will provide the
foundation for a constitutional system that has a far greater degree of transparency
and actual doctrinal stability.

